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A major area of concern for Korean unification is the immense cost it will impose 
on South Korea. To lessen this burden, South Korea will need to initiate policy reforms 
that can ease the financial stress and repercussions of unification and create an integrated 
economic community with North Korea.  At the same time, North Korea will need to 
create an environment that is conducive to economic integration by accepting and 
adopting reform measures that can build the foundation for a market economy.  The two 
largest factors to any economic reform strategy in North Korea would be to overcome the 
changes to the political-belief system that drives the current economy and the strong link 
between the state and masses. A policy of engagement will create an environment in 
which inter-Korean dialogue and mutual cooperation could lead to a transformed, opened 
North Korea. The unification of Germany and Yemen offer pros and cons as well as 
similarities and dissimilarities to Korea to form certain conclusions, predictions, and 
prescriptions. The case studies of China and Vietnam provide a detailed analysis of 
planned economies transitioning to market economies. From these case studies, several 
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The economic implications of Korean unification are proportionally one of the 
largest obstacles, question marks, and areas of concern.  Korean unification will not be 
cheap nor will it be seamless.  The World Bank has estimated that the cost of Korean 
unification could amount to several trillion dollars. To alleviate the immense cost 
involved in unification and to avoid the sole economic burden, South Korea will need to 
initiate policy reforms that can ease the financial stress and repercussions of unification 
and create an integrated economic community with North Korea.  At the same time, 
North Korea will need to create an environment that is conducive to economic integration 
by accepting and adopting reform measures that can build the foundation for a market 
economy.  The formula for success in both the South and North is intricate and lengthy, 
but in each case the importance of the situation facing the two Koreas requires immediate 
and essential economic policy reform.  
Given the complex situation involving the Korean peninsula, South Korea has 
three choices in terms of policy direction toward North Korea: a policy of containment 
that could stir up a confrontation by exploiting mutual distrust and touching off an arms 
race; a policy of benign neglect that could endanger the nation's security in the absence of 
serious efforts to engage North Korea in a number of issue areas; and a policy of 
engagement that will create an environment in which inter-Korean dialogue and mutual 
cooperation could lead to a transformed, opened North Korea.  
The policy of engagement, according to South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, 
“is the only practical choice and offers the best chance to fulfill the goal of the South 
Korean people – the maintenance of peace on the Korean Peninsula.”  A series of events, 
including the historic inter-Korean summit during June 2000, follow-up meetings of 
officials, and the reunions of separated families, were made possible due to the success of 
the engagement policy.  As a result of engagement, the previously unimaginable dialogue 
between North and South Korea was sustained, despite worldwide tension caused by the 
September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.  As an avenue of the engagement 
policy, South Korea should be able to conduct joint and mutual economic activities and 
xvi 
induce a flow of foreign investment into North Korea to help begin its economic 
recovery.  With the appropriate policy already in place, both Koreas have the right tools 
to establish the kind of peaceful and conducive atmosphere it needs to make economic 
integration a success.  
In order to begin the  successful economic integration of the Korean peninsula, 
certain economic reforms in North Korea would have to be implemented. The 
transformation effort would have to involve fundamental reforms of the economic 
planning mechanism and the introduction of market principles in decision-making, 
production, and allocation of resources.  As such, the object of economic reform in North 
Korea would be to replace the socialist pattern of a planned economy with a market-
oriented economy.  The challenge to any such reform is, however, the complex nature 
and interconnected institutions of the industrial complex.  The two largest factors to any 
economic reform strategy in North Korea would be to overcome the changes to the 
political-belief system that drives the current economy and the strong link between the 
state and masses.  First, economic liberalization would mean the nearly complete 
dissolution of Juche. A market economy stands for everything that Juche preaches 
against, including a socialist state structure.  Secondly, the state is intimately involved in 
every decision regarding the economy, even at the lowest level and regardless of scope.  
Economic liberalization would cause the state to relinquish its power and authority to 
external market forces. 
A slow, careful approach to reducing tension and increasing ties between the two 
Koreas is needed to provide time for a more complete integration of the two societies 
prior to full unification. Such an approach could mitigate the impact of some of the more 
socially disruptive and economically costly aspects of the unification process. After 
unification, Korea will be preoccupied internally. All available capital will be channeled 
into reconstructing the threadbare North. The daunting task of infrastructure investment 
and industry retooling will take years. As the cases of Yemen and Germany show, a more 
deliberate economic union and integration prior to unification will ease many of these 
burdens. 
xvii 
China and Vietnam are examples of gradualist economic reform. Because of the  
size and scope of the industrial sectors in each country, the reform strategy has thus far 
been successful, especially initially. Both countries were largely agrarian with very little 
heavy industry. Thus, the growth and increased standard of living that resulted from 
initial agricultural reforms provided a cushion to absorb some of the political turmoil of 
reform and in addition countered the erosion of political legitimacy. In North Korea, 
because of its centrally planned and heavily industrialized economy, the gradualist 
approach would be an unsuccessful option. However, the reforms in China do provide a 
good analysis of what North Korea potentially faces. 
The gradual and calculated economic integration of the Korean peninsula will be 
a long-term project that will require serious patience and perseverance. A continued 
separate economic future will only widen the gap between the North and the South and 
further increase the possibility of catastrophe. Any delay in economic integration will 
also continue to increase the costs of unification, creating enlarged burdens for the South 
as the North further continues its economic decline. Thus, building trust gradually 
through economic and humanitarian exchanges is a means for advancing both the short 































“The question is not will [North Korea] disintegrate, but rather how it will 
disintegrate, by implosion or explosion and when.”1 
-General Gary E. Luck, the former commander of 
U.S. and U.N. forces in South Korea. 
 
A conclusion can be drawn from recent academic studies, detailed research, and 
expert opinion: Korean unification is not a matter of if it will occur but rather of when 
and how.  The immediate prospects for unification seem unrealistic, but the inevitability 
of change is certain.  The most popular and well-supported argument conveys that the 
North Korean regime, faced with harsh domestic conditions and intense international 
pressure, sits on the verge of collapse.  Only time will tell if impending failure brings the 
communist North2 to the negotiating table or creates the unintended consequence of 
chaos, or even the more unnecessary result, war.  Nevertheless, a unified Korean 
peninsula is a realistic expectation, regardless of the means by which the two Koreas 
unite.   
The economic implications of Korean unification are proportionally one of the 
largest obstacles, question marks, and areas of concern.  Korean unification will not be 
cheap nor will it be seamless.  The World Bank has estimated that the cost of Korean 
unification could amount to several trillion dollars.3 To alleviate the immense cost 
involved in unification and to avoid the sole economic burden, South Korea4 will need to 
initiate policy reforms that can ease the financial stress and repercussions of unification 
and create an integrated economic community with North Korea.  At the same time, 
North Korea will need to create an environment that is conduc ive to economic integration 
by accepting and adopting reform measures that can build the foundation for a market 
economy.  The formula for success in both the South and North is intricate and lengthy, 
but in each case the importance of the situation facing the two Koreas requires immediate 
and essential economic policy reform.  
                                                 
1 Testimony before the House Committee on National Security, Washington, D.C., March 28, 1996. 
2 North Korea or Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK. 
3 All monetary figures are given in U.S. dollar amounts. Thomas Andersson and Carl Dahlman, Ed., Korea 
the Knowledge-Based Economy: Making the Transition (Washington, DC: World Bank Institute, 2000), 27. 
4 South Korea or Republic of Korea or ROK. 
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A. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH KOREA 
Given the complex situation involving the Korean peninsula, South Korea has 
three choices in terms of policy direction toward North Korea: a policy of containment 
that could stir up a confrontation by exploiting mutual distrust and touching off an arms 
race; a policy of benign neglect that could endanger the nation's security in the absence of 
serious efforts to engage North Korea in a number of issue areas; and a policy of 
engagement that will create an environment in which inter-Korean dialogue and mutual 
cooperation could lead to a transformed, opened North Korea.5  
The policy of engagement, according to South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, 
“is the only practical choice and offers the best chance to fulfill the goal of the South 
Korean people – the maintenance of peace on the Korean Peninsula.”6  A series of events, 
including the historic inter-Korean summit during June 2000, follow-up meetings of 
officials, and the reunions of separated families, were made possible due to the success of 
the engagement policy.  As a result of engagement, the previously unimaginable dialogue 
between North and South Korea was sustained, despite worldwide tension caused by the 
September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.  As an avenue of the engagement 
policy, South Korea should be able to conduct joint and mutual economic activities and 
induce a flow of foreign investment into North Korea to help begin its economic 
recovery.  With the appropriate policy already in place, both Koreas have the right tools 
to establish the kind of peaceful and conducive atmosphere it needs to make economic 
integration a success.  
 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTH KOREA 
In order to begin the successful economic integration of the Korean peninsula, 
certain economic reforms in North Korea would have to be implemented.  The 
transformation effort would have to involve fundamental reforms of the economic 
planning mechanism and the introduction of market principles in decision-making, 
production, and allocation of resources.  As such, the object of economic reform in North 
                                                 
5 Kim Jung Min, “Clutching at Straws”, Economic Monitor: South Korea, 18 Oct 2001. 
6 “The Korean Economy and Economic Policy”, FAO APFSOS Working Paper NO. 6-1.1(Dec 2001) 
http://www.fao.org/montes/fon/fons/outlook/asia/06/APFSOS02.htm 
3 
Korea would be to replace the socialist pattern of a planned economy with a market-
oriented economy.  The challenge to any such reform is, however, the complex nature 
and interconnected institutions of the industrial complex.  The two largest factors to any 
economic reform strategy in North Korea would be to overcome the changes to the 
political-belief system that drives the current economy and the strong link between the 
state and masses.  First, economic liberalization would mean the nearly complete 
dissolution of Juche.7  A market economy stands for everything that Juche preaches 
against, including a socialist state structure.  Secondly, the state is intimately involved in 
every decision regarding the economy, even at the lowest level and regardless of scope.  
Economic liberalization would cause the state to relinquish its power and authority to 
external market forces.8 
In order to better determine a plan for future economic integration, an analysis is 
required of both the North Korean and South Korean economies. Using the case studies 
of the unification of Germany and Yemen, the pros and cons as well as similarities and 
dissimilarities to Korea will form certain conclusions, predictions, and prescriptions with 
regard to the economic implications of Korean unification. Two additional case studies, 
China and Vietnam, provide a detailed analysis of planned economies transitioning to 
market economies.  In both cases, the state maintained its communist facade but adopted 
economic reforms that transitioned each economy into market systems. China and 
Vietnam are realistic examples for Korea because they are Asian, and in each case the 
existing regime maintained political power. From these analyses case studies, several 
conclusions are drawn regarding the implications of economic unification. 
                                                 
7 William J. Taylor, “The Korean Peninsula at the Crossroads: Which Way?” in The Two Koreas And The 
United States: Issues of Peace, Security, and Economic Cooperation. Ed. Wonmo Dong (New York: M. E. 
Sharpe, 2000), 222. 
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II. COMPARISON OF ECONOMIC SYSTEMS AND POLICIES 
Upon formal division in 1946, the difference between the economic potential of 
North and South Korea was striking. The 38th parallel seemed to divide the peninsula in a 
manner most advantageous to the North. The vast majority of the raw materials were 
located in the North, along with about 90 percent of Korea’s energy generating capacity.9 
The majority of the economic infrastructure created by the Japanese during the 
occupation period was located in the North. Although heavily damaged in the Korean 
War, the North had a strong foundation on which to build. Economic and technical 
support from the PRC and USSR also helped quickly rebuild the economy.  
Nevertheless, two thirds of the total population lived in the predominantly 
agricultural South. The South had an extremely weak economy following the departure of 
the Japanese and did not reach a level of self-sufficiency until the late 1960s. Strained by 
the war effort and with little economic reform or development, South Korea subsisted on 
foreign aid, mostly from the United States. 
Before the 1960s, Korea’s economic progress contradicted common belief. The 
North’s socialist system experienced substantial growth through the last years of the 
1950s and into the 1960s. The South experienced an average annual growth rate of only 2 
percent throughout the 1950s. Without aid from the United States and other allies, the 
South’s economy would have probably produced no growth whatsoever. In this period, 
the North appeared as the economic model and the South as the economic failure. 
However, over the next thirty years crucial economic growth, technological change, and 
structural transformation took place, both shaping the present and impacting the future.10  
 
A. SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The South Korean economy suffered neglect during the tenure of President 
Syngman Rhee, which began in 1948. President Rhee was preoccupied with his own 
political stability and much less concerned with economic prosperity. His economic 
                                                 
9 James A Gregor,  Land Of The Morning Calm: Korea And American Security (Washington, DC: Ethics 
and Public Policy Center, 1990), 20.  
10 Gregor, 21. 
6 
policies were not well planned nor were they well implemented. Rhee’s policies sought 
only to increase government leverage over the business sector in order secure his power 
base and reduce political opposition.  
The post-Korean War period in the South saw some economic growth, but not to 
the level that was expected. The average annual growth rate from 1953 to 1960 was 4 
percent in real terms “despite the tremendous need for reconstruction and the demand for 
import substitution of those goods, which required only simple technology.”11 The 
economy was suffering in numerous areas, including poor management, a high inflation 
rate, negative real interest rates, low domestic savings, overvalued exchange rates, and 
large trade deficits. To stay afloat, foreign aid financed more that 70 percent of the 
South’s total imports.12 
Syngman Rhee’s rule over the South ended abruptly in 1960. The successor 
government to Rhee promised reform, but it had neither the resources nor the initiative to 
create a stable political and economic environment. On May 16, 1961, Major General 
Park Chung-hee staged a military coup, gained control of the government, and enacted 
martial law. By October 1963, a stable environment had been created, and General Park 
was elected president in a national election.  
 
1. Park Chung-hee’s Revitalization 
The Park era is marked by rapid industrialization and unprecedented economic 
growth. Behind this economic expansion was Park’s goal of successful reunification of 
the Korean peninsula. To achieve this, Park believed that real growth and sustained 
development could only be accomplished by making the ROK a contributing member of 
the international economic community. 
Park’s pursuit of an export led growth strategy caused the inflated national 
currency to be devalued. It also encouraged domestic savings and investment. “As a 
consequence, between 1961 and 1964, the national currency of the ROK was devalued by 
                                                 
11 Koo Young-nok and Suh Dae-Sook, Ed. Korea and The United States: A Century of Cooperation 
(Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1984), 244. 
12 Koo Young-nok and Suh Dae-Sook, 245. 
7 
almost 50 percent and interest rates on savings were doubled.”13 Signaling an increase in 
domestic saving, by 1975 investment was financed out of domestic resources, up from 
just 30 percent in 1962. Also, domestic savings equaled 27 percent of the GNP in 1975 
compared to 3 percent in 1962. Thus, the government had reduced the amount of GNP 
devoted to private consumption, from 85 percent in 1962 to 65 percent in 1975, allowing 
the government to commit the remainder to domestic capital formation. 14  
Park implemented a series of five-year development plans that began in 1961. 
These plans sought to stimulate and sustain export growth through accelerated 
depreciation on fixed assets employed by the export industries, tax advantages for export 
companies, tariff reductions on intermediate capital goods and raw materials used in the 
production of export items, and discretionary access to credit as well as exchange-rate 
advantages for major exporting firms.15  In 1976, growth peaked at 15.5 percent. Over the 
fifteen-year period between 1961 and 1976 growth averaged 9.5 percent. As a result, this 
same period also saw the GNP increase by 400 percent.16  
Table 1: GDP Growth Rates Under Park Chung-hee 
Plan Period Growth Rate 
1962-1966 7.7 percent  
1967-1971 11.3 percent 
1972-1976 10.9 percent 
1977-1981 5.8 percent 
Source: Shahid Alam, 55.17 
 
                                                 
13 Song Byung-Nak, The Rise of the Korean Economy , Second Edition (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), 15. 
14 Song Byung-Nak, 29. 
15 Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 
1997), 67. 
16 Cumings, 82. 
17 Shahid M Alam, Governments and Markets in Economic Development Strategies: Lessons From Korea, 
Taiwan, and Japan (New York: Praeger, 1989), 55. 
8 
Japan provided a major stimulant to the South’s remarkable economic growth 
under Park’s tenure. After the 1965 normalization of relations between South Korea and 
Japan, public and private Japanese investment in Korea surged, reaching $1.2 billion by 
1970, only to exceed $3 billion by 1973.18 In only eight years, South Korea had become 
Japan’s second largest trading behind only the United States. 
International political currents had a huge influence on the Park’s economy. After 
President Nixon vowed in 1969 to withdraw U.S. forces from Vietnam and reduced the 
number of U.S. forces in Korea from 60 thousand to 40 thousand, Park directed a large 
increase of investment into heavy industry. This was done particularly to create a military 
industrial complex to support a self-sustaining South Korean military. In 1977 President 
Carter sought to further reduce the number of U.S. forces in Korea. This action, although 
unfulfilled, created fears that the United States would not militarily aid South Korea. 
Thus, the Park administration committed itself to creating an industrial base sufficiently 
strong enough to provide for its own defense.  
Combined with borrowing to support investment into heavy industry and the oil 
shocks of the late 1970s, foreign debt in the South increased from $2 billion in 1970 to 
$20 billion in 1979.19 In 1980, for the first time since 1961, the South recorded negative 
growth, with the economy falling by 5.2 percent from the previous year, creating 
unprecedented domestic tension complementing concerns over national security. 
Resistance to Park’s authoritarian manner began to mount until he was assassinated in 
October 1979. A successor government quickly assumed power, but just as Park had 
done, the military staged another coup in August 1980 and General Chun Doo-hwan was 
elected President shortly there after.  
 
2. Post-Park Transition  
Severe measures that reduced inflation were imposed by President Chun imposed, 
and the economy recommenced its self-sustained growth. 20 During the fifth plan period 
(1982-1986) the South grew at a rate of 7.1 percent and export expansion resumed at a 
                                                 
18 Ralph Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1975), 165. 
19 Gregor, 35. 
20 Sakong Il, Korea In The World Economy  (Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 
1993), 44-45. 
9 
rate of over 25 percent a year by 1986.21 This signaled that the recession of the early 
1980s was over and the ROK economy was continuing its course of expansion. Chun 
credited the government’s commitment to advanced industrialization and ability to 
respond to change as the reason for continued growth. 
After Chun left office in 1988 growth continued, due in large part to the continued 
economic development plans and the priority the government placed on it. The South 
grew at a rate of 7 percent during the sixth plan period (1987-1991).22 The period 
following the sixth economic period show the stark influence of the Cold War in the 
region and the effect the end of Soviet influence had on the economic parity between the 
two Koreas. As well, the 1988 Olympics brought newfound advantages to South Korea 
within the global market. In 1992, the South’s GDP was $294.5 billion and its per capita 
GDP was $6,749.23 In comparison, the North’s GDP (estimated) the same year was $21.1 
billion and per capita GDP was $943.24  
 
3. Post-Cold War Economy 
From 1992 to 1997, South Korea was one of the four fast growing economies in 
Asia, averaging 6.6 percent GDP growth over that period.25 This made it the best 
performing emerging market in the world. Despite its phenomenal economic success, 
Korea was not immune to the financial crisis that engulfed much of East and Southeast 
Asia. In November 1997, Korea followed Thailand and Indonesia in suffering a loss of 
international investors' confidence, resulting in a severe foreign exchange liquidity crisis. 
The Korean won lost over 50% of its value against the dollar by the end of 1997, and 
foreign currency reserves dropped to dangerously low levels.26 In December 1997, Korea 
signed an enhanced $58 billion IMF package, including loans from the IMF, World Bank, 
and the Asia Development Bank. Under the terms of the IMF program, Korea agreed to 
accelerate the opening of its financial and equity markets to foreign investment and to 
                                                 
21 Sakong Il, 36. 
22 Gregor, 102. 
23 Wonmo Dong, The Two Koreas And The United States: Issues of Peace, Security, and Economic 
Cooperation  (New York: M. E. Sharp, 2000), 55-57. 
24 Dong, 59. 
25 Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, “The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects,” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (October 1998), 7. 
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reform and restructure its financial and corporate sectors to increase transparency, 
accountability, and efficiency. 27 
The 1997 financial crisis exposed an array of fundamental problems, including 
enormous over-capacity, a near bankrupt banking sector, and mountains of private sector 
debt. Nonetheless, South Korea made a remarkably strong cyclical economic recovery. In 
doing so, the ROK has made more progress in financial and cooperate reform than any of 
the other countries heavily impacted by the crisis. Because of the South Korean reform 
effort, there has been a surge in direct foreign investment since 1998 and South Korean 
debt has been upgraded by foreign credit-rating agencies. A key to success has been the 
implementation of a significant legal structure to guide the process of economic reform. 
Korea’s goal has been “to move from a system with a relatively high level of state 
guidance to a truly market-based system.”28 
 
B. NORTH KOREAN ECONOMIC DISARRAY 
In contrast to the South, North Korea pursued a socialist revolution under the 
pretense of securing a material base for the liberation of South Korea. Because the North 
sought development only within the framework of the concept of a limited value, the 
DPRK failed to take proper advantage of the economic superiority it enjoyed over the 
South.  
1. Juche 
The poor performance of the North Korean economy is attributable to the fact that 
private ownership of production facilities has been banned in favor of state ownership. 
On this basis, a planned economy was instituted in which all production, distribution, and 
consumption activities are undertaken only on the orders from authorities.29 The DPRK 
initiated agrarian reforms in March 1946 during the Soviet occupation, prior to the 
establishment of Kim Il-sung’s communist regime. In August 1946 important 
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manufacturing plants, transportation, communications, and banking facilities began to be 
nationalized, thus setting the foundation for public ownership of all assets.30 
After the Korean War, from 1953 to 1958, agriculture was collectivized and 
private sectors of commerce and industry were nationalized. In 1958 private ownership of 
all production means was eliminated in favor of overall public ownership in all economic 
areas. The only private production allowed was by farmers through the cultivation of the 
land around their homes and through other small businesses run during off-duty hours.31 
This planned economy was relatively effective for post-war rehabilitation and early 
industrialization. With the progress of industrialization, however, the planned economy 
began to backfire. The reversal of the North’s economic superiority began in the late 
1960s, when the South began to take a striking lead, due in part to President Park’s 
emphasis on economic development and the North’s complete economic centralization.  
The later downfall of the North’s economy was rooted in this period in the 
relentless creation of heavy industry and the neglect of the agricultural sector. External 
trade was conducted nearly exclusively with other socialist states.  The majority of the 
products traded were noncompetitive on world markets. The labored work force was 
heavily neglected, receiving only rationed necessities, which allowed the government to 
accumulate resources that would be used for investments. Each of these practices created 
the foundations of later economic ruin in the North. 
The emphasis on heavy industry was common to most planned or economies. In 
the North, it was considered the source of power, as stated by Kim Il-sung. “Heavy 
industry constitutes the material basis for the country’s political and economic 
independence…and is necessary to develop military strength to protect the revolutionary 
state against the threat of capitalist aggression.”32 Massive projects centered on the heavy 
industries did produce impressive statistics and high visibility, similar to those 
experienced in China under Mao’s “Great Leap Forward.” However, these projects did 
not produce marketable products or satisfy quality and demand criteria. 
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 The early stress on industrial development did not mature into balanced growth. 
The emphasis on heavy industry neglected consumer needs, the agricultural sector, and 
light industries. In 1964, only 20 percent of state investment, the highest percentage on 
record, was allocated to agriculture, while 60 percent was earmarked for heavy 
industry. 33 By 1966, the North could only meet the basic food needs of the people 
through strict rationing. That was also the last year the North last published data on grain 
production, signifying that yields were declining as a result of the low priority and 
investment rates in agriculture.34 In 1967, the Seven Year Plan was extended to 1970, and 
even by then production goals were not attained.35 
Because of the economic stagnation in the 1960s the DPRK leadership sought 
drastic changes in its economic plan and modified the development strategy that had 
previously guided the country. In 1970, the North sought to import technologies from 
capitalist countries. By 1974, 60 percent of DPRK imports were from non-socialist 
sources, as contrasted to 11 percent in 1971, sugesting that socialist countries, especially 
the USSR and China, did not make advanced technologies available to other socialist 
countries. 36 This had an adverse affect on the DPRK’s economic prosperity and growth. 
Regardless of the a1970s reforms, the North entered the 1980s with a lagging 
economy, barely able to provide the minimum in social services. New reforms were 
adopted, but they proved ineffective. In 1984, the DPRK leadership adopted regulations 
allowing foreign companies of any origin to enter into joint ventures.37 This reform was 
ineffective because of the North’s unattractive economic environment. Still, amidst 
economic ruin, the DPRK continued to dedicate as much as 20 percent of the GNP to its 
military. 
North Korea became the first socialist country to default on its international trade 
debts. The first blow was the oil crisis of 1973. Because of the North’s self- imposed 
isolation from the international market, the country was unable to sell its raw materials 
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and goods on the international market to address its oil shortage. Debt continued to grow 
while the North’s resources continued to shrink. When the burden of paying off the debts 
proved too difficult, the country simply defaulted. In 1987, after several attempts to 
negotiate a rescheduling agreement failed, the North’s creditors declared the country in 
default.38 By 1989, the North’s trade debts reached $6.78 billion. 
 
2. The End Of The Cold War 
Paradoxically, in its quest for Juche in pursuit of its impressive early 
industrialization, Pyongyang became heavily dependent on Soviet aid.39 Once the Soviet 
Union fell, Pyongyang was not prepared to enter the world economy. Roh Tae-woo’s 
policy of “Nordpolitik” further isolated the North from Beijing and Moscow. By the same 
token, Pyongyang, with its own behavior, further isolated itself from Washington and 
Tokyo. 
According to Samuel Kim, the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, and poor management and decision making by the 
DPRK leadership had cumulative effects on the North Korean economy leading to its 
decline in the 1990’s.40 The events resulted in: 
· The sudden demise of Soviet aid. 
· The collapse of the socialist world market. 
· The structural problems of the command economy with little material 
incentives. 
· The over-allocation of resources to heavy industry and military spending. 
· The inordinate misappropriation of human and natural resources dedicated to 
the deification of its leadership. 
As a result, the North Korean economy contracted by a four th from 1990-1995, with an 
average annual growth of negative 5.3 percent over that period.41 
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By the end of the Cold War in 1991, the North Korean economy had reached 
crisis stage. As a result, the country faced the onset of a food crisis and potential famine. 
By 1995, the DPRK officially made diplomatic appeals for food. By 1998, foreign 
official and unofficial reports estimated that between 2 and 3 million people had died of 
starvation since 1991.42 
 
3. Current Conditions  
In the North, all aspects or life have been state-governed, just like the means of 
production. Food is either rationed by the government or distributed in the rural areas 
according to each member’s work contribution. The government rations cereals bi-
weekly, work clothes and ordinary dress twice a year, and a pair of other woven goods 
every quarter. People can buy necessary goods either in state or cooperative stores or in 
the secondary market in limited quantities. All housing units are socialized “all-people 
ownerships” or “cooperative ownerships.” Only the small party and government elite 
enjoys access to a larger variety of gods and services. The vast majority of the country 
lives in a similar condition of despair.43  
The decision to stick with a failing centrally planned economy when it has been 
abandoned everywhere else in the world is the source of the North’s economic problems. 
Even after Kim Il-sung died in 1994, the regime never swayed from his course and even 
today echoes his same stringently socialist philosophy of self-reliance. This allows no 
reform and closes the possibility for constructive feedback inside as well as outside the 
government In China and Vietnam, as part of their economic reform effort, there is no 
problem in admitting to the failures of previous policies. Still, like the days of Chairman 
Kim, the North still spends a large amount of its resources on pet projects and 
monumental structures and a tremendous amount on the military. 44 
North Korea is a swollen garrison state, fielding the fifth largest army in the 
world. The ratio of troops to total population is by far the highest for any country in the 
post-Cold War era. Counting the 1.2 million men on active duty and the 5.9 million in 
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reserve, 29 percent of the DPRK’s population is in the military. 45 The direct defense 
expenditure in North Korea is estimated to be around 25 percent of its GDP. However, it 
is estimated that up to 50 percent of the DPRK’s national income is spent, directly or 
indirectly, on military needs, thus reducing its capacity to meet basic human needs.46 
Regardless, economic difficulties have been witnessed affecting military readiness. 
Training exercise have been significantly reduced due to lack of fuel and spare parts as 
well as food shortages. It is even reported that the morale of the troops is severely being 
affected by the shortages.47  
Today, North Korea is one of the world’s most centrally planned and isolated 
economies, facing desperate economic conditions. Industrial capital stock is nearly 
beyond repair as a result of under investment and spare parts shortages. The nation faces 
its seventh year of food shortages because of weather related problems, including major 
drought in 2000, and chronic shortages of fertilizer and fuel. Massive international food 
aid deliveries have allowed the regime to escape the major consequence of spreading 
economic failure, such as massive starvation, but the population remains vulnerable to 
prolonged malnutrition and deteriorating living conditions. Large scale military spending 
eats up resources needed for expanding investment and consumption goods. In 2000, 
after the historic inter-Korean summit, the regime placed emphasis on expanding foreign 
trade links, embracing modern technology, and attracting foreign investment. But in no 
way did it relinquish central control over key national assets or undergoing market-
oriented reforms.48 
The North Korean economic model of self-sufficiency has failed. Because the 
North has neglected infrastructure and focused its economic spending on its military 
buildup, it has failed its ideal of self-sufficiency.  When the Soviet Union fell and China 
withdrew its aid, the North Korean economy suffered tremendously. When floods 
devastated the country in the early 1990s, the DPRK lacked the technology and the 
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economic resources to cope. As a result of the natural disasters and lack of fertilizer and 
external food sources, famine has overtaken the country, killing an estimated 1.2 million 
people.49 Over the same period, South Korea saw unprecedented economic growth, aside 
from the downturn of the 1997 Asian economic crisis, by successfully implementing an 
export-oriented industrial strategy.  
 
C. PROSPECTS 
North Korea is facing the common problems of a centrally planned economy; lack 
of innovation, poor quality control, declining productivity, and above all, massive food 
shortages. These issues are catastrophic in proportion and have closely intertwined 
economics and politics. As the economic base beneath the North Korean state falters and 
the prospect of state failure draws closer, the lethal power in the hands of the regime and 
the leadership’s incentives to exploit it continue to increase. Despite North Korea’s 
severe economic difficulties, the countries ambitious military program continues to move 
ahead as evident from the North’s supposed nuclear arms development and the August 
1998 firing of a Taepo Dong-1 rocket over the main island of Japan. 50. It even seems 
possible that the North’s “military burden,” the ratio of the DPRK’s defense expenditures 
to national output, may have actually risen over the course of the 1990’s.  
North Korea has made clear it cannot risk the political fallout of major economic 
changes. In response to growing economic crisis, the leadership restructured the 
government, not to seek reform, but to preserve the existing system. The DPRK regime is 
unwilling to unleash the unpredictable political forces economic change would generate 
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III. THE ROAD TOWARD INTEGRATION AND UNIFICATION 
Debated and predicted since the end of World War II, the prospect of Korean 
unification seems closer than ever, yet never has it been more distant. The Korean 
peninsula was the crossroads of the Cold War, entrenching the division and making inter-
Korean dialogue nearly impossible. Both sides embarked on efforts of rapprochement and 
progress toward peaceful unification during that very tense period, but made little 
headway. The rapid succession of momentous changes in the international system from 
1989 to 1991 – the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, German reunification, the end of the 
Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union and of international communism – created 
the most glaring hope that divided Korea was heading inexorably toward reunification. 
However, the two still stand divided today. Nevertheless, recent efforts supporting mutual 
recognition and legitimation have brought the two Koreas closer to a peaceful 
coexistence as two separate states. 
 
A. NORTH KOREAN EFFORTS 
The reunification of Korea on the DPRK’s own terms, has been an overriding 
policy objective for the North since the formal division in 1948.51 The existence of 
another Korean state poses the largest threat to the legitimacy of the North Korean 
regime. Thus, unification is considered essential to guaranteeing continued state 
existence. As history points out, this goal motivated the surprise attack on the South in 
June 1950. That strategic move was nothing more than the execution of the North’s 
unification policy. The policy has since been interpreted as the termination of the ROK.52  
One of the earliest North Korean proposals for peaceful unification came in 1960. 
Amidst social and political unrest in South Korea, Kim Il-sung issued a proposal for the 
creation of a “confederation of North and South Korea.” Kim’s assumption was that the 
North must find a way to reduce South Korea’s deep-seated mistrust of the communist 
                                                 
51 Eberstadt, The End of North Korea, 25.  
52 Marcus Noland, “The Future Of North Korea,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis (May 2002), 26-28. 
18 
system in order for the two Koreas to at least coexist.53 The plan would have let both 
Koreas maintain their respective political systems and autonomy while creating an 
environment where they could both cooperate economically and culturally. The proposal 
called for a commission to facilitate trade and economic cooperation among the different 
economic and trading sectors. The idea, though staunchly opposed by Seoul at the time, 
could be considered the prophetic foundation of the South Korean objectives today. The 
proposal is strikingly similar to what is envisioned by Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine 
policy.”54 
The North Korean unification policy has, however, become a race against time. 
Growing economic problems, the fall of communism in Russia and Europe, and the thaw 
in ties between China and South Korea put the North’s policy into serious jeopardy with 
the absence of any outside support with which to develop legitimacy. Thus, the North’s 
policy of communizing the Korean peninsula had reached a dead end. South Korea’s 
entry to the United Nations (UN) is arguably the severe blow for the North Korean 
regime, causing a reversal in the North’s policy that Korea should have a single united 
voice within the international community. As a result, the DPRK agreed to join the UN at 
the same time the ROK was admitted entry. 55 
The DPRK’s policy objectives toward the ROK are, to all intents and purposes, 
synonymous with its policy objectives toward the rest of the world. The objectives are: to 
maximize North Korean domestic security; to obtain international recognition at the 
expanse of the ROK, if not as the only lawful Korean government on the peninsula, then 
as the coequal half of the Korean nation; to reunify Korea by forcing the withdrawal of 
U.S. troops from the South and by eliminating the rival regime in Seoul; and, pending 
unification, to persuade the ROK government to accept the practicality of peaceful 
coexistence within a framework of dialogue and mutual cooperation.56 
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B. SOUTH KOREAN OVERTURES 
The 1970s were a time of great progress and change, as well as regression and 
entrenchment. The general direction of the decade was that Kim Il-sung and the North 
Koreans clung strictly to his purpose of unifying Korea on his terms. However, he shifted 
his strategy between force and diplomacy when it most benefited his cause. Park Chung-
hee, by contrast, de-emphasized unification and relentlessly pushed ahead with his 
economic plans designed to increase the South’s prosperity. However, he often met 
resistance because, instead of relaxing his militaristic style and authoritarian discipline 
over society, he increased it.57 
The first steps toward engaging the North were taken by President Park in August 
1970 when he suggested that the ROK was willing to co-exist peacefully with the DPRK. 
He urged both sides to mutually replace hostile military confrontation with 
socioeconomic competition. His efforts led to the historic July 4, 1972 joint communiqué 
between the North and South, which emphasized pursuing unification independently and 
peacefully by transcending any differences with national unity. 58 Listed as follows, the 
principles were simply stated and amounted more to an agreement of non-aggression than 
of cooperation.   
“Unification should be achieved by Koreans without outside interference; 
that it should be achieved by peaceful means, not by the use of force; that 
neither side defame the other or engage in armed provocations, and that 
both would cooperate positively in the Red cross talks; that a direct 
telephone ‘hot line’ would be installed between Seoul and Pyongyang; and 
that a North-South coordinating committee would be established to solve 
various problems between the two sides and settle the unification problem 
on the basis of the principles agreed on.”59 
Little progress toward unification was made by dialogue was established, but with little 
consequence of commitment to further coordination. 
In 1982 President Chun Doo-hwan issued a statement announcing a new peaceful 
unification formula that decried the awkward and un-natural relations between the North 
and South. He stressed the need for normal contacts between both states to promote 
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“national” well-being. Chun even suggested that by promoting a broad range of economic 
exchanges and cooperation including, but not limited to, trade, transportation, and 
communications, relations should be normalized.60  
In July 1988, President Roh Tae-woo further clarified the idea of engagement 
with North Korea, defining the goals that engagement policy should embrace. Roh 
believed that the reason the Korean peninsula continued to be divided was not the fault of 
the policies of either side, but rather the notion that each side regarded the other as an 
adversary. He stressed the need for each side to view North-South relations as potential 
partners in pursuit of the common goal of prosperity. Roh made the first concrete steps to 
implement this proposal by creating legal and administrative mechanisms in the South to 
regulate economic interactions. He then called for a balanced development of both 
Korean economies, suggesting that the prosperous South aid and assist the deteriorating 
North.61 
President Kim Young-sam further elaborated an engagement policy, declaring 
that the South had no desire to “absorb” the North, as the German unification scenario 
would indicate. Kim then called for an inter-Korean summit, stressing the need to create a 
single national community. Kim Il-sung formally accepted the invitation for a summit, 
but died shortly after. Kim, however, continued to stress peaceful unity and labeled the 
North’s food shortages and economic problems as problems for the South as well. Kim 
subsequently became the first President to give direct aid to the North in any form.62 
Kim Young-sam’s policy on reunification specified a three-stage process: 
reconciliation and cooperation; a Korean commonwealth; and a single nation-state.63 
Kim’s administration viewed the example of German unification as a very possible, and 
even likely, Korean scenario and feared the enormous economic costs. As a result, he felt 
that greater economic aid from the South would lure the North toward a more acceptable 
path and lead to greater opportunities of investment and joint ventures, which in the long 
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term would lead to a penetration of North Korean society. 64 Nevertheless, during Kim 
Young-sam’s administration, the North placed numerous impediments in the way of 
inter-Korean rapprochement through trade.  
The early 1990s saw a dramatic increase in inter-Korean contacts and 
negotiations, culminating in the agreement on “Reconciliation and Non-Aggression.” 
After a series of high- level exchanges agreement was reached to further promote 
cooperation and exchanges while pledging not to threaten use of force against one 
another. This agreement, along with the denuclearization declaration that both cooperated 
in creating, solidified the South’s commitment to an engagement policy toward the 
North.65 The agreement included avenues for creating joint economic ventures and 
sharing state visits by cabinet level officials. However, by the end of 1992, the DPRK had 
seemed to revert back to its familiar policies and practices. Economic conditions in the 
North had become grave, and experimentation with economic reforms was strongly 
resisted. By 1993 North Korea’s unification policy was irrelevant, given the condition at 
hand. The pressing problem was now regime survival. 66 
In 1994, the United States and the DPRK signed the Agreed Framework, by 
which the DPRK agreed to freeze its nuclear development while the Korea Peninsula 
Energy Development Organization (KEDO) – a consortium of countries led by South 
Korea, the United States and Japan – agreed to provide two light-water reactors (LWR) 
for two power plants in the North. 67 Initially, when the LWR project was launched, 
discord broke out between the South and North Korean workers deployed for the project, 
mostly due to differences in culture and perception. Such tensions, however, gradually 
ebbed away. Preliminary work for the LWR construction site began in August 1997, and 
the full- fledged work started in February 2000, when the project's main contract went 
into effect. In early spring 2001, site preparation work at Kumho was completed, but 
construction has since made slow but significant progress.68  
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C. SUNSHINE POLICY 
Shortly after his inauguration in February 1998, ROK President Kim Dae-jung 
made clear that finding a way for the North and South to live together peacefully, rather 
than achieving unification, would be his top priority. He thus unequivocally ruled out 
absorbing North Korea as a goal of South Korean policy, seeking peaceful co-existence, 
reconciliation, and cooperation between Seoul and Pyongyang instead.69 By adopting this 
approach toward relations with the North, President Kim ordered any reference of the 
word “unification” removed from all official government documents, publications, or 
speeches. He instead substituted terms like “policies toward the north” and “constructive 
engagement policies.” Kim has not jettisoned the goal of eventual unification by adopting 
the Sunshine Policy, but he sees it as a long-term goal. Driven by the expected costs of 
unification and a fear of the absorption scenario, Kim instead chose the short-term goal of 
peaceful coexistence and cooperation that would eventually set the stage for unification. 70 
The administration formally predicated its policy on three basic principles. 
· No toleration of North Korean armed provocations. 
· No South Korean efforts to undermine or absorb the North. 
· Active ROK attempts to promote reconciliation and cooperation between the 
two Koreas. 
One of the core components of this policy is the separation of politics and economics. 
The South’s private sector was thus allowed greater leeway in making its own decisions 
concerning trade and investment with the North. It also meant that the administration 
would ease restrictions that hindered inter-Korean business, while limiting the 
government’s role primarily to matters of humanitarian and other official assistance. 
These actions underlined President Kim’s belief that the North would be more receptive 
to economic than political inducements.71 
Kim’s stated objective is to create a single joint economic sphere that would 
propel development over time of a broader socio-cultural community. To expand that 
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goal through economic cooperation, the Kim Administration has encouraged 
businessmen to visit the North, lifted the ceiling on investment allowed in the North, and 
simplified legal procedures. There were also efforts to reach agreement with the North to 
prevent double taxation and guarantee essential investments. However, as Norman Levin 
points out, “expanded economic cooperation is intended to benefit both Koreas. But the 
[Kim] administration has been explicit that it will focus first on areas most important to 
the North, partly because of Seoul’s superior economic position and partly because of 
Pyongyang’s paranoia about South Korean ‘penetration.’”72  
Over the first three years of the Kim Dae-jung Administration (March 1998-April 
2001), the South provided the North with $230 million in combined government and 
private channel assistance. This figure is a decrease compared to the amount expended in 
the three previous years (June 1995-February 1998), which totaled $284 million. 73 Of the 
$4.3 billion planned for investment in the North in 2002, 96 percent, or $4.1 billion, was 
planned for the light water reactor project. That leaves a remaining $171 million for 
direct investment into other projects.74 
Total aid covering the whole period from 1998 (the first year of Kim Dae-jung’s 
government) through 2001, stood at $188 million (235 billion won), which amounted to 
less than two dollars per South Korean a year. In terms of the ROK GDP, the year of 
2000, when the largest amount of aid was provided ($110 million), is a case in point. The 
aid amount of that year was equivalent to 0.024 percent of the nation's GDP of $455.2 
billion. While it is clear that the aid amount was rather small, it is equally important to 
note that the aid served an even greater cause – extending humanitarian assistance to 
brethren in the North. This aid will no doubt help to reduce the threat of war on the 
Korean peninsula. In the long run, the assistance may prove to be a wise investment for a 
more promising economic future for both Korea's, while in the short run it may help 
revive the North Korean economy.75  
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Critics of the Kim Dae-jung Administration are numerous. Norman Levin and 
Yong-Sup Han do, however, summarize the most common skepticism of the “Sunshine 
Policy.” 
“Many South Koreans reject the Administration’s assumption that major 
internal changes can be produced in the North by providing ‘assurances’ 
of the regime’s survival. They also do not believe that South Korea can 
induce the North to end its hostility and accept peaceful coexistence 
simply by renouncing ‘absorption,’ conveying ‘sincerity’ in desiring 
reconciliation, and encouraging the U.S. and others to normalize relations 
with Pyongyang.”76 
Nevertheless, from 1998 to the end of 2001, a total of 24,747 South Koreans traveled to 
North Korea. The number represents more than a ten-fold increase over the 1989-1997 
period, when only 2,405 visits were recorded.77  
 
1. 2000 Inter-Korean Summit 
The inter-Korean summit meeting in June 2000 marked a new beginning. For the 
first time since Korea was divided 54 years ago, the top leaders of South and North Korea 
met to discuss peace and reunification. President Kim Dae-jung proposed the inter-
Korean summit meeting in his inaugural speech in 1998 and repeated the proposal at 
every opportunity thereafter. During a visit to Berlin in March 2000, President Kim 
reiterated the need for government- level dialogue in order to promote economic 
cooperation between Seoul and Pyongyang. Shortly thereafter, Kim Jong- il accepted the  
invitation and agreed to host President Kim in Pyongyang. 
Through conferences over three days and two nights, the two leaders reached the 
fundamental understanding that only dialogue and cooperation would promote the 
prosperity and peaceful reunification of their homeland. On the basis of this 
understanding, they created a South-North joint declaration, which states:  
“The South and the North have agreed to resolve the question of 
reunification on their own initiative and through the joint efforts of the 
Korean people, who are the masters of the country…Acknowledging that 
there are common elements in the South's proposal for a confederation and 
the North's proposal for a federation of a lower stage as the formulae for 
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achieving reunification, the South and the North agreed to promote 
reunification in that direction…The South and the North have agreed to 
consolidate mutual trust by promoting balanced development of the 
national economy through economic cooperation and by stimulating 
cooperation and exchanges in civic, cultural, sports, public health, 
environmental and all other fields.”78 
The declaration confirmed the principle that the Korean people should resolve Korean 
problems themselves. It said there exists common elements in the unification formula of 
both South and North Korea. This clause effectively removes unnecessary controversies 
over whose formula is preferable.  
The ministerial talks that followed the summit have produced agreements to carry 
out the South-North joint declaration. The two sides agreed to reconnect a railway 
between the North and South, open an overland route to Mt. Geumgang, the scenic 
mountain in North Korea, and develop an industrial complex at Gaeseong near the 
border. Subsequently, agreements were reached regarding several joint  economic and 
development ventures.79 
· Construction work to reconnect the Seoul-Sinuiju Railway and a parallel 
highway, and opening them at an early date;  
· Construction of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex;  
· Study on linking gas pipelines to and from South Korea through Russia and 
China;  
· Working- level consultations to allow the passage of merchant shipping 
through the two Koreas' respective exclusive waters;  
· A field survey for flood prevention measures along the Imjin River basin; and 
· Consultations on possible joint fishing operations in the East Sea.  
In the joint declaration the two Koreas agreed to promote balanced development 
of the national economy through economic cooperation. There were six rounds of talks 
on economic cooperation, three each in 2000 and  2001, to implement this particular point 
of accord.  There were two rounds of working- level contacts to work out a legal 
framework for expanding inter-Korean economic exchanges on a permanent basis, and a 
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meeting of the Committee for the Promotion of Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation was 
held. Meetings were also held on electricity supply from the South, on prevention of 
flood damage along the Imjin River, and on the Mt. Geumgang tourism project. In order 
to promote stable economic exchanges, South and North Korea produced four agreements 
on investment protection, settlement of commercial disputes, prevention of double 
taxation and clearance of accounts.80  
 
a. Reconnection Of Seoul-Sinuiju Railway And Road  
The two sides agreed to reconnect the Seoul-Sinuiju Railway and road 
during the first two rounds of ministerial talks. In addition, the two defense ministers 
agreed in principle on entry and security procedures in the DMZ for personnel and 
materials involved in the project. The South broke ground for the work in a ceremony on 
September 18, 2000 and completed repairing the railway on the southern segment at the 
end of December 2001. The formal signing of a military guarantee agreement is still 
pending, however. 81 
Since September 30, 2001, railway service started between Munsan and 
the Imjin River station near the border five times a day on weekdays and nine times on 
weekends and holidays. The state-run Korea National Railroad is using the re- linked 
portion for tourism and national security education. It also plans to run special trains for 
the old refugees from the North to come near the border to pay respect to their relatives in 
North Korea during traditional holidays.82  
 
b. Joint Imjin River Flood Prevention Project  
The Imjin River project will enable the two sides to pool their efforts to 
prevent flood damage along the North-South border and make a peaceful use of the river 
and the adjoining DMZ area in the long run, bringing benefits to both sides. At the 
second ministerial meeting, the two sides agreed to push for a joint Imjin River flood 
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control project at an early date. And they were able to considerably narrow the 
differences as to how they will form a survey team and conduct the study during the first 
session of the Committee for the Promotion of Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation and 
at a working- level consultative meeting. 83  
During the fifth ministerial talks, they also agreed to begin a field survey 
along the river as soon as necessary steps are worked out between the military authorities. 
Although implementation of these agreed points has been delayed, the South is fully 
ready to comply with the joint field survey and others steps. It also intends to promote 
cooperation in water resources development in other rivers flowing across the border.84 
 
c. Development Of Gaeseong Industrial Complex  
An agreement to develop the Gaeseong Industrial Complex was concluded 
between Hyundai Corporation and North Korea's Asia-Pacific Peace Committee in 
August 2000. This led Hyundai and the Korea Land Corporation to conduct a feasibility 
study in the Gaeseong area for the industrial complex. 85  
Once the projected industrial complex is built, South Korea's technology 
and capital will be combined with North Korea's manpower. Such a development would 
help small businesses in the South regain international competitiveness while distributing 
wages to North Korean workers. South Korea is asking the North to enact laws related to 
wages, employment, land leasing, taxes and remittances at an early date for Southern 
companies' free production activities in North Korea.  
 
d. Areas Of Concern 
The fourth item of the joint declaration called for balanced economic 
development through cooperation. This would entail two major efforts. First, the South 
would have to invest capital, resources, and infrastructure in the North over a long period 
to bring the DPRK to the level of the ROK. Public enthusiasm over time, as reflected in 
public opinion polls conducted by the Korea Herald, shows declining support for this 
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idea as the Korean economy slowly recovers from the Asian economic crisis. Secondly, 
the declaration called for greater economic integration. Again, public opinion shows 
declining support given the enormous gap between the two economies and the ROK’s 
own economic difficulties.86 
The majority of the project agreements that give South Korean cash 
payments to the North provide neither restrictions nor control over their use by the North. 
Such payments can thus be allocated however the North wants, including the acquisition 
of tanks, missiles, artillery and other weaponry. 87 The Mt. Kumgang project involves 
activities far removed from North Korean population centers, thus significantly limiting 
the opportunity for discovery. This is a critical element, however, for encouraging long-
term change in the North. Nevertheless, the project isolates the South’s investors, 
workers, and administrators from their Northern counterparts.88 
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IV. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
Unification will require tremendous investment in the North. The cost estimates 
are staggering – as $1 trillion, twice the amount of South Korea’s current GDP.89 
Nevertheless, South Korea’s economic superiority indicates that it will lead the 
unification effort. However, even with outside assistance, South Koreans would have to 
bear severe taxes and harsh economic sacrifices to meet the costs. Therefore, the South 
Korean government must become more involved in the private activities of the South’s 
business firms, which pursue commercial interest only, to promote Northern economic 
exchanges and cooperation with consistency. 90 Also, North Korea must open its doors to 
South Korean capital and technology, because this is the first step to prepare the two 
sides to recover homogeneity and expand inter-Korean economic cooperation. 
 
A. ENGAGEMENT JUSTIFICATION 
The most advantageous scenario for Korean unification calls for economic 
unification prior to political unification. 91 This approach measures the resources 
necessary to raise North Korea to some percentage of South Korean income in order to 
ease the harsh economic consequences of unification. The odds are against South 
economically stronger in the near term upon unification. The negative data are intuitive 
given the dire conditions in North Korea, thus supporting the idea of gradual 
unification. 92  
Most cost estimates of unification assume that the South would be required to 
raise per capita income in the North to parity with that of the South. 93 But even in 
developed countries, it is not unusual to have levels of economic development that differ 
from region to region. However, the extent of the current disparity between North and 
South would have to be ameliorated to ease the pain of unification. It is possible that 
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economic growth in the North, spurred by foreign and ROK investment, could offset 
some of the expense of unification. 
If that investment is eventually accomplished, it is far better to attempt to begin 
that effort now, when unification is still well into the future, than to be faced with 
rebuilding a North Korean economy that has experienced several more years of 
contraction. Some may doubt whether trade and investment in North Korea should be 
undertaken at a time when the regime’s behavior is characterized more by intransigence 
than by cooperation. 94 However, it is those engagement practices that are credited with 
moving communist China toward increased engagement with the West and adopting 
market reforms. The two nations are different in many respects, but the true effectiveness 
of engagement policies toward North Korea cannot be judged until they are undertaken in 
full measure, without regard to quid pro quo responses.95  
The fundamental goal of inter-Korean economic exchanges is to upgrade the level 
of national welfare after unification by establishing a foundation for a national 
community in the present. Therefore, inter-Korean economic exchanges should be 
implemented by consistently taking into account long-run considerations for restoring 
peaceful coexistence. Each of these steps will eventually aid in creating market-based 
reforms in the North, which will greatly aid in transitioning the North’s economy during 
the unification process.  
The greatest challenge will be in encouraging businesses to invest in North Korea. 
North Korea’s starving, impoverished and significantly smaller populace forms a much 
less promising consumer base than China. The ROK would have to provide incentives 
and loan credits to jump start investment in the North. However, a lifting of trade 
sanctions could ease the barriers to humanitarian assistance efforts, paving the way for 
more profit-driven endeavors in the future.96 Even ROK President Kim Dae-jung, in 
keeping with his “Sunshine policy,” has advanced the need to separate politics and 
economics with respect to the North. Kim’s goal is to decrease North Korea’s isolation 
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and relieve its grinding poverty and famine. Although Kim seeks a separation of political 
and economic issues, it is clear that he feels the best chance for making political inroads 
is to pave the way economically.97 
Nicholas Eberstadt labels four “independent, but interrelated” arguments 
supporting “rapprochement through trade.”98  
· First, “the North Korean system is objectively in need, perhaps in desperate 
need, of precisely those quantities that intensified inter-Korean economic 
coordination could provide.” 
· Second, “North Korea’s leadership is well aware of the country’s deep 
economic difficulties and of the urgency with which trade opportunities and 
other international economic contacts must now be pursued.” 
· Third, “an economic opening in North Korea would be in South Korea’s own 
financial interest, rather than simply an exercise in checkbook diplomacy.” 
· Fourth, “South Korea has a record of demonstrated success in bringing 
formerly hostile communist states to the point of rapprochement and beyond, 
through economic diplomacy.” 
Taken together, all four points comprise a convincing argument as to why it is in the 
interest of both South and North Korea to expand commercial ties. For the South, the 
North is an untapped resource to increase production and profits. The opportunity for 
investment seems to be developing, because in the past, North Korean leaders have been 
blind to the inefficiencies of their economy. Today, the regime seems to be completely 
aware of its inefficiencies, which bodes well for the prospect of progress. South Korea 
has the experience of opening relations with China, the Soviet Union, and many East 
European nations when it was neither popular nor unproblematic to do so. So the 
challenge of opening North Korea is one for which it is well suited.99  
Nevertheless, the issues surrounding North Korea make it a unique situation unto 
itself. The greatest fear of the DPRK regime is that outside forces that may destabilize the 
socialist system or disrupt the regime’s legitimacy. A long-held belief in the North is that 
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capitalist and imperialist forces intend to do just that. With that in mind, the regime in 
power now would be the same one faced with adopting the much-needed economic 
reforms and heading the majority of the joint venture projects recommended. These 
actions in the North’s view have enormous potential to create social chaos. In addition, 
the same policy makers who led the country on a downward spiral also have no economic 
merit to assess alternative proposals that would aid development. It can be deduced that 
DPRK authorities, for reasons of self interest may continue to not support greater 
economic integration with South Korea and the rest of the capitalist world, regardless of 
the growing need for such. 100  
President Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine policy,” compounded by the fact that North 
Korean economy is near collapse and its people are starving, presumes that deepening 
economic coordination between the North and the South will lead to greater 
rapprochement. By expanding trade, development projects, and joint ventures, tensions 
can be lessened and mutual financial interest will outweigh ideological confrontation. 
This theory would create a two-fold success. First, greater economic coordination now 
will ease the pain of economic integration when the Korean peninsula is unified. Second, 
by increasing commercial ties, the North Korea regime will be indirectly exposed to 
liberalizing forces, thus creating an environment more conducive to change.101 
 
1. Current Efforts and Successes 
The Kim Dae-jung government has established its priority on providing fertilizer 
to help improve North Korea's agricultural output as well as emergency relief food to 
help alleviate the North’s chronic food shortage problems. Since 1998, private-sector aid 
to the North has totaled $150 million. The government has also paid special attention to 
improving the public health and medical situation, with particular emphasis on the 
underprivileged class of North Korean society. South Korean aid to North Korea since 
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the year of 1998 totaled $183.3 million, amounting to about 17 percent of the total aid 
provided by the international community. 102  
While maintaining the basic policy of providing direct support, the government 
also participated in humanitarian relief programs sponsored by UN organizations. For 
example, it supplied 100,000 tons of corn in 2001 under the World Food Program and 
provided malaria vaccines to the World Health Organizations campaign to prevent the 
spread of malaria in North Korea.103 
Private sector assistance to the North has complemented the government's 
program. The private-sector aid has developed from occasional relief assistance to 
continuous and specialized support for agricultural development and medical services. 
Moreover, items included in these programs are diversified to include agricultural 
products and equipment in addition to various medicine and other pharmaceutical 
supplies. Private sector programs have shown that technical assistance and long-term 
recovery projects to improve agricultural output are possible in addition to in-kind aid.104  
· Agricultural area: Seeds improvement, livestock farming, growing vegetables, 
supply of farming materials, etc.  
· Medical/public health area: Shipment of tuberculosis vaccine, modernization 
of hospital facilities, pharmaceutical supplies, etc.  
· Environmental area: Reforestation, participation in the program to prevent 
damage to pine forests caused by blight and harmful insects, etc.  
Inter-Korean trade, which totaled $18.7 million in 1989, soared to $100 million in 
1991, $200 million in 1995 and $300 million in 1997. Trade volume fell to the $200 
million range in 1998 due to an economic downturn (caused by a foreign exchange crisis) 
before recovering the $300 million range a year later. The year 2000 saw inter-Korean 
trade at its highest level of $425 million, and approximately $400 million recorded last 
year. Also up sharply were the number of participating firms and items traded. A total of 
30 companies registered in 1989 ballooned to 652 in 2000 with the number of items 
swelling from 26 in 1989 to 646 in 2000. If the Seoul-Sinuiju Railway begins operation, 
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inter-Korean trade, helped by a reduced transportation cost and a direct route, will gain 
added impetus, enhancing a competitive edge in terms of production and sales of 
goods.105  
 
2. Other Needs  
It is essential for South and North Korea to have institutional devices in place to 
buttress inter-Korean economic cooperation such as investment protection and prevention 
of double taxation. This will permit entrepreneurs from the South to invest safely in the 
North, and both sides will be able to expand economic exchanges and cooperation on a 
stable basis. South Korea will need to work diligently to put into effect the four economic 
agreements regarding investment protection, prevention of double taxation, clearance of 
accounts and settlement of commercial disputes, and their follow-up measures. The South 
will also need to continue to develop other institutional devices, including rules on traffic 
and communications, certification of origin and industrial standards. 
To achieve economic balance, the economic needs of the DPRK should also be 
considered in the political socio-cultural context. North Korea’s social and economic 
system is highly inefficient and failing, as evidenced by negative fiscal growth, 
starvation, and sub-standard living conditions. Therefore, the North Korean regime needs 
to recognize the efficiency of the market system and the need to change its economic 
system to prepare for unification. 106  
Samuel Kim lists changes in policies most essential for the North to achieve 
successful implementation of economic reform and economic integration with the South.  
· “Thorough restructuring of the ownership system and the system of economic 
decision-making in Pyongyang, major agricultural reform coupled with the 
family owning system (decollectivization). 
· Gradual expansion and extension of a free trade and economic zone from the 
Rajin-Sonbong area to other eastern and western coastal cities, even some 
                                                 
105 IMF. Country Information – Korea, Republic of. 
106 Eberstadt, "Economic Recovery in the DPRK: Status and Prospect."  
35 
political reform measures keyed to the functional requirements of a market-
oriented but still state led economy. 
· Extensive opening to the global economic system with Pyongyang joining (are 
allowed to join) all the keystone international economic institution (e.g., 
APEC, Asian Development Bank, IMF, the World Bank, and WTO). 
· Full normalization of relations with Tokyo with a compensation package of 
about $12 billion in several categories (e.g., grants-in-aid, soft loans, and 
credits). 
· Return to north-South dialogue and détente, if not a peace treaty, accompanied 
by considerable aid and great expansion of inter-Korean economic 
cooperation. 
· Select and gradual demobilization of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) to 
generate more labor force needed to fuel North Korea’s modernization of 
agriculture, light industry, and science and technology. 
· Sending students to, and inviting foreign experts from, Japan, the United 
States, and Europe for advance training, as post-Mao reformers have done 
since 1979.”107 
These policy steps do not require simultaneous execution and could be implemented 
separately and gradually. Obstacles stand in the way of each liberalizing 
recommendation, but they are neither insurmountable nor impossible to overcome.  
 
B. OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF INTEGRATION 
One of the major issues standing in the way of economic integration is the 
extreme secrecy under which the North Korean regime operates. Accurate statistics are 
nearly impossible to collect, and the numbers that are released have very little credibility. 
State budgets are periodically released by Pyongyang, but often years after the fact. All 
other economic statistics are heavily guarded by the DPRK, out of a fear of exposing 
weaknesses. What data that can be gathered are highly analyzed, and estimates of North 
Korean economic activities are made, admittedly with a considerable amount of 
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speculation. 108 North Korea, instead of looking outward for ways to promote economic 
development, has been one of the most inward looking of nations. It has traded 
principally with the Soviet bloc and China, exporting mainly primary products. Such 
trade, has minimized the need for personal contacts between North Koreans and 
outsiders. It is a trading process well-suited to protecting the people of North Korea from 
undesired outside influences, but ill- suited to making the people and products of North 
Korea widely known throughout the world.109 As a result, Pyongyang has faired poorly in 
attracting foreign investment in the Rajin-Sonbong free-trade zone, largely because of 
political restraints. In September 1998, the U.N. attempted to sponsor an investment fair 
in order to boost interest, but the DPRK excluded the participation of 60 South Korean 
firms at the last minute.110  
In addition, the North Korean regime has resisted economic reform. Masao 
Okonogi points out: 
“In essence, North Korea is facing the same dilemma that the Soviet 
Union and China faced. Clinging to the old political system and placing 
restrictions on people, goods, money, and information makes economic 
reconstruction impossible. Freedom in these areas, however, will bring to 
the surface the contradictions of the old system and produce political 
instability. Contact with the outside world that comes with economic 
opening and improvements in people’s livelihood will, in the end, 
necessitate a reform of the economic system (through the introduction of a 
market economy), and reform of the economic system will in turn lead to a 
reform in ideology and the political system.”111 
Nevertheless, faced with a food shortage of nearly 2 million tons in 2002 and a still 
moribund economy, North Korea’s desperation is growing. At the same time, the very 
success of its "feed me or I’ll kill you" extortion tactics over the past several years is 
constraining Pyongyang’s behavior even as it keeps North Korea on life support. The fact 
that the massive amounts of food, fertilizer and other international aid that have poured 
into North Korea from the United States, South Korea and the international community 
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since 1995 have given Kim Jong-il something to lose. This suggests new boundaries for 
North Korean behavior and increased leverage for United States-South Korean-Japanese 
trilateral diplomacy. 112 
 
C. POST-INTEGRATION AND UNIFICATION EFFECTS 
A unified Korea will need to consider a strategic approach to maximize economic 
effectiveness and efficiency within an open and competitive free market framework. In 
the short term, the unified government will need to establish a balanced income 
distribution policy between the South and North Korean people.113 In the long term, an 
overall economic development plan will need to be developed with a focus on building 
the North while not sacrificing the South. This plan should also consider economic 
development within the region, as well as the global economic community. In order to 
achieve success, a large emphasis will need to be placed on the role of internal and 
regional corporations within a unified Korean economic market.114 
 After Korean unification, the total population of the Korean peninsula will be 
around 70 million people. This population level will be an attractive consumer group for 
domestic and international market incentives. Even though North Koreans are not 
familiar with market concepts, they will be able to gain knowledge and experience 
through a scaled and concerted transition process from their former system to the new 
system. South Koreans are immersed in the market system, but they will need patient and 
incremental reforms to aid the North Korean population. 115 
 
1. The Effects Of Unification On Japan 
The ROK does not possess the capability to finance unification alone. Even a 
ROK foreign ministry estimate placed the cost of unification at $1 trillion in 1999 with 
expected substantial growth every year the North-South economic gap widens. In order to 
alleviate this huge financial burden, the ROK will need considerable inflows of foreign 
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aid and investment, before and after unification. While the United States, Europe, and the 
United Nations will pledge support, those efforts will not be substantial enough. The 
country that will have the greatest economic impact on unification is Japan. 116 The 
greatest incentives for Japan are the cheap, literate and proximate Korean workforce.  
Korea will also possess a huge market for commercial exports and investment.  Historical 
resentment aside, Japan and Korea have cooperated economically since normalization in 
1965. During the economic industrialization of Korea in the 1960s and 1970s, Japan was 
the key source for foreign-capital. Unification will present a similar scenario to the 
Japanese.117 
 
2. The Effects Of Unification On China 
Following unification, China’s greatest concern for Korea will be security, with 
Japan and China competing for the greatest sphere of influence over a unified Korean 
peninsula. Economically, China sees a unified Korea as a primary competitor for exports 
of manufactured goods. Korea, on the other hand, sees China as a long-term economic 
threat. Korea, throughout the 1990s, maintained a considerable export advantage over the 
Chinese in the United States and Japan. However, by 1999 the gap had closed to a $1.9 
billion advantage and $400 million disadvantage respectively. 118 After unification, 
“Korea will be faced with a flood of price-competitive Chinese manufactured goods that 
challenge its own firms.”119 In the short-term, Korea’s greatest competitor for low and 
medium technology goods is Japan, but the long-term Chinese economic threat to a 
unified Korea looms large. 
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V. CASE STUDY: GERMANY 
The unification of Germany provides an example of unification by absorption. In 
this case, capitalist West Germany absorbed communist East Germany during a period of 
radical change. The unification of the two rival states was not seamless, but it did proceed 
with unprecedented speed. Numerous difficulties were encountered, but today a unified 
Germany boasts the third largest economy in the world and is a leading actor in the 
European Union (EU) and NATO. How did Germany recover from the vast problems 
encountered with unification? What positive steps were taken to prevent complete 
economic and political chaos? What mistakes were made and how could they have been 
prevented? How can the German example be applied to Korea? The scenario that was 
played out in Germany witnessed the peaceful disintegration of East Germany 
culminating in absorption by West Germany. In Korea, this was once the most desired 
and even anticipated option. However, the huge economic costs of rapid implosion have 
dampened South Korean enthusiasm. 120  
 
A. CREATING TWO STATES 
West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany or FRG) and East Germany 
(German Democratic Republic or GDR) were created much the same way that the 
Korean peninsula developed into two separate states. After Germany's unconditional 
surrender on May 8, 1945, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR 
occupied the country and assumed responsibility for its administration. France was later 
given a separate zone of occupation. Although the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and the Soviet Union agreed at Potsdam in August 1945 to a broad program of 
decentralization, treating Germany as a single economic unit with some central 
administrative departments, these plans failed. The turning point came in 1948, when the 
Soviets withdrew from the four-power governing bodies and blockaded Berlin.121 
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B. WEST GERMANY 
The United States and Britain moved to establish a nucleus for a future German 
government by creating the Central Economic Council for their two zones. The program 
later provided for a West German constituent assembly, an occupation statute governing 
relations between the Allies and the German authorities, and the political and economic 
merger of the French with the British and American zones. In 1949, the Basic Law, the 
constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, was promulgated and formed the first 
federal government.122  
The FRG quickly progressed toward full sovereignty and association with its 
European neighbors and the Atlantic community. The London and Paris agreements of 
1954 restored full sovereignty (with some exceptions) to the FRG in May 1955 and 
opened the way for German membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU).123  
The three Western allies retained occupation powers in Berlin and certain 
responsibilities for Germany as a whole. Under the new arrangements, the Allies 
stationed troops within the FRG for NATO defense, pursuant to stationing and status-of-
forces agreements. With the exception of 45,000 French troops, Allied forces were under 
NATO's joint defense command.124  
 
C. EAST GERMANY 
In the Soviet zone the Social Democratic Party was forced to merge with the 
Communist Party in 1946 to form a new party, the Socialist Unity Party (SED). The 
October 1946 elections resulted in coalition governments in the five Land (state) 
parliaments with the SED as the undisputed leader. A series of people's congresses were 
called in 1948 and early 1949 by the SED. Under Soviet direction, a constitution was 
drafted in 1949 and adopted, which was celebrated as the day when the German 
Democratic Republic was procla imed. The Soviet Union and its East European allies 
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immediately recognized the GDR, although it remained largely unrecognized by 
noncommunist countries until 1972-73.125  
The GDR established the structures of a single-party, centralized, communist 
state. In 1952, the traditional Leander was abolished and, in their place, 14 Bezirke 
(districts) were established. Effectively, all government control was in the hands of the 
SED, and SED members held almost all important government positions.126  
The National Front was an umbrella organization nominally consisting of the 
SED, four other political parties controlled and directed by the SED, and the four 
principal mass organizations (youth, trade unions, women, and culture). However, control 
was clearly and solely in the hands of the SED. Balloting in GDR elections was not 
secret. As in other Soviet bloc countries, electoral participation was consistently high, 
with nearly unanimous candidate approval. 127  
 
D. GERMAN UNIFICATION 
The constant stream of East Germans fleeing to West Germany placed great 
strains on FRG-GDR relations in the 1950s. In 1961, the GDR began building a wall 
through the center of Berlin to divide the city and slow the flood of refugees to a trickle. 
The Berlin Wall became the symbol of the East's political encumbrance and the division 
of Europe. However, in 1969, Chancellor Brandt announced that the FRG would remain 
firmly rooted in the Atlantic alliance but would intensify efforts to improve relations with 
Eastern Europe and the GDR. The FRG commenced this Ostpolitik by negotiating “non-
aggression” treaties with the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and 
Hungary. 128  
The FRG's relations with the GDR posed particularly difficult questions. Though 
anxious to relieve serious hardships for divided families and to reduce friction, the FRG 
under Brandt was intent on holding to its concept of "two German states in one German 
nation." Relations improved, however, and in 1973, the FRG and the GDR were 
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simultaneously admitted to the United Nations. The two Germanys exchanged permanent 
representatives in 1974, and, in 1987, GDR head of state Erich Honecker paid an official 
visit to the FRG. 129  
During the summer of 1989, rapid changes took place in the GDR, which 
ultimately led to German unification. Growing numbers of East Germans emigrated to 
the FRG via Hungary after the Hungarians decided not to use force to stop them. 
Thousands of East Germans also tried to reach the West by staging sit- ins at FRG 
diplomatic facilities in other East European capitals. The exodus generated demands 
within the GDR for political change, and mass demonstrations in several cities continued 
to grow. In early October 1989, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev visited Berlin to 
celebrate the 40th anniversary of the establishment of the GDR and urged the East 
German leadership to pursue reform. 130  
On October 18 Erich Honecker resigned as head of the SED and as head of state 
and was replaced by Egon Krenz. Nevertheless, the exodus continued unabated, and 
pressure for political reform mounted. On November 4 a demonstration in East Berlin 
drew as many as 1 million East Germans. Finally, on November 9, the Berlin Wall was 
opened, and East Germans were allowed to travel freely. Thousands poured through the 
wall into the western sectors of Berlin, and on November 12, the GDR began dismantling 
it.131  
On November 28 FRG Chancellor Kohl outlined a 10-point plan for the peaceful 
unification of the two Germanys based on free elections in the GDR and a unification of 
their two economies. In December, the GDR eliminated the SED monopoly on power, 
and the entire Politburo and Central Committee resigned. The SED changed its name to 
the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) and the formation and growth of numerous 
political groups and parties marked the end of the communist system. On December 7, 
1989, agreement was reached to hold free elections in May 1990 and rewrite the GDR 
constitution. On January 28 all the parties agreed to advance the elections to March 18, 
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primarily because of an erosion of state authority and because the East German exodus 
was continuing apace with more than 117,000 people leaving in January and February 
1990.132  
In early February 1990 Chancellor Kohl, who affirmed that a unified Germany 
must be a member of NATO, rejected a proposal for a unified, neutral German state. 
Finally, on March 18, the first free elections were held in the GDR, and a government 
was formed under a policy of expeditious unification with the FRG. The freely elected 
representatives held their first session on April 5, and the GDR peacefully evolved from a 
communist to a democratically elected government. On July 1, the two Germanys entered 
into an economic and monetary union. 133  
 Conclusion of the final settlement cleared the way for unification of the FRG and 
GDR. Formal political union occurred on October 3, 1990, with the accession (in 
accordance with Article 23 of the FRG's Basic Law) of the five Leander, which had been 
reestablished in the GDR. On December 2, 1990, all-German elections were held for the 
first time since 1933.134  
 
1. Economic Implications  
Even though great damage was inflicted on both East and West Germany during 
World War II, both nations had emerged as potent economies by the 1960s. West 
Germany became a leading economic world power in the 1970s and 1980s, and East 
Germany was a leader among Warsaw Pact economies. Unification, however, brought 
serious economic problems. Western Germany has had to shoulder high taxes to fund 
improvements in infrastructure, environment, and industry in the east, while many 
Eastern enterprises have collapsed in the face of Western competition. 135 Still, Germany 
remains a powerhouse in the world economy, with a 2000 GDP of $1.9 trillion. 136 
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The unified German economy has been marked by vulnerability to external 
shocks, domestic structural problems, and continued difficulties in integrating the 
formerly communist East into the capitalist system of the West. From the 1948 currency 
reform until the early 1970s, West Germany experienced almost continuous economic 
expansion, but real GDP growth slowed and even declined from the mid-1970s through 
the recession of the early 1980s.137 The economy then experienced eight consecutive 
years of growth that ended with a downturn beginning in late 1992. Since unification in 
1990, Germany has seen annual average real growth of only about 1.5 percent coupled 
with stubbornly high unemployment.138 The best performance since unification was 
registered in 2000, when real growth reached 3.0 percent. Most forecasters expect growth 
of about 1.5 percent in 2001 while unemployment remains above 9 percent.139  
Ten years after the unification of the two German states, significant progress has 
been made in raising the standard of living in eastern Germany, introducing a market 
economy and improving infrastructure there. At the same time, the process of 
convergence between East and West is taking longer than originally expected, and on 
some measures, has stagnated since the mid-1990s. Eastern economic growth rates have 
been slower than in the West in recent years, unemployment is twice as high, prompting 
many skilled easterners to seek work in the West, and productivity continues to lag. 140 
Eastern consumption levels are dependent on public net financial transfers from West to 
East, totaling about $65 billion per year, or about 4 percent of the GDP of western 
Germany. In addition to social assistance payments, the government plans to extend 
funds to promote eastern economic development through 2019. 141  
While unification brought together long-separated families and friends, it also 
brought numerous economic and social problems to Germany, including housing 
shortages, strikes and demonstrations, unemployment, and increases in crime and right-
wing violence against foreigners. Budget deficits caused by unification, and worsened by 
a recession, have led to increased taxes, reduced government subsidies and increased 
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privatization, and cuts in social services.142 While increasing the market for consumer 
products, unification has significantly affected the strength and competitiveness of the 
German economy. Even after more than ten years since the two German states unified, a 
recognizable gulf is evident between the two Germanys in standards of living, industrial 
performance, and infrastructure.143 
 
2. Similarities to Korea 
The German unification scenario does share some important similarities with 
Korea. North Korea, like East Germany, enjoyed a period of independent economic 
success despite disadvantageous external conditions. The East Germans were also 
strongly supported by the Soviets and the other East European communist nations. North 
Korea enjoyed the same support until the end of the Cold War. South Koreans, like the 
West Germans, feel that their democratic and capitalist system must be adopted in a 
unified nation, and the other side must reform in order for unification to be possible. 
Although analysts acknowledge this dimension of the German unification process, it is 
consistently underplayed in favor of greater attention to the anticipated economic costs of 
Korean unification. 
The economic dimensions of the former FRG compared to the former GDR 
somewhat resemble South Korea compared to North Korea. At the time of unification in 
1990, the FRG ‘s GDP was roughly ten times that of the GDR’s.144 That same year, 
South Korea enjoyed a similar advantage. However, since 1990, the South Korean 
economy has grown to nearly twenty times that of the North, partly because of the 
North’s consecutive years of negative growth and lack of foreign aid. At the end of 1991, 
about a year after unification, the East German GDP was $60.2 billion, while the West 
German GDP was $1.28 trillion. 145 Thus, the East only represented about 8.3 percent of 
the West’s economy. Today, more than ten years later, little parity has been reached and 
West Germany is still far stronger the East economically. This same scenario may play 
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out in the case of Korea because of the many years in which the North neglected its 
economic infrastructure, while the South flourished. 
It is important to note that East Germany was much less isolated and more 
interdependent than North Korea is today. In any event, East Germans had much more 
contact with both Western nations and more progressive socialist countries, like Hungary, 
that had already commenced political and economic reform. 146 Although North Korea 
shares a border with one of the more democratic societies in East Asia, any calls for 
reform would be made within the vacuum of the current regime’s self imposed isolation. 
Compared to Germany prior to its unification, North and South Korea do not 
possess as great a disparity in population size. Whereas West Germany’s population was 
five times that of East Germany, South Korea’s is only twice that of North Korea. Thus, 
there will be proportionally fewer South Koreans to support a potentia lly destitute 
northern population. Assimilating a population half its size into its limited social security 
framework will be a difficult task. Furthermore, South Korea’s social welfare system is 
far less extensive than Germany’s characteristically generous Western European model, 
so the overall expenditure requirements could be less.147 
German unification, in many ways, differs from the circumstance present in 
Korea and gives rise to the argument that absorption is not the favored scenario in 
Korea’s case. First, German unification was literally the result of chance, not natural or 
incremental unification as proposed by the theory of “peace through pieces.” Chance 
unification in Korea is not likely to happen and would likely bring about the most chaotic 
of consequences. Second, The pre-unification excitement in Germany was quickly 
replaced by post-unification despair. A unified Germany witnessed an unprecedented rise 
in unemployment, social alienation, and domestic unrest. In Korea, hope and desire for 
unification is varied and diverse largely because the cost estimates of unification. The 
North’s extremely dire economic conditions predict that the social conditions following 
unification will be extremely dire and extensive in scope. Last, post-unification Germany 
did not experience a rise in nationalism and national identity and therefore did not have a 
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solid domestic foundation with which to begin reconstruction. Although ethnically 
unified, the Korean peninsula is heavily fractionalized and politically fragile. Therefore it 
does not invoke the confidence of creating a solid national identity following unification, 
regardless of the means.148 
The unification of Korea, apart from the vast political and social problems to be 
encountered, would inflict larger relative cost burdens on South Korea and its allies than 
have occurred in the German example. Charles Wolf gives two examples of disparity that 
support this argument. First, “the population of North Korea compared with the South 
(about one half) is twice as large as that of East Germany compared with West 
Germany.” Second, “per capita GDP in North Korea relative to South Korea is probably 
much lower (perhaps one-fifth to one-sixth) compared to that between East Germany and 
West Germany in 1990.”149  
However, Wolf also points to two examples of how the Korean situation is 
positively unique from the German example. 
· First, “the economic burden on North Korea from its relatively huge military 
establishment is enormously greater in relative terms than were the costs of 
the German Democratic Republic (GDR) military establishment preceding 
German reunification. In North Korea the military establishment absorbs 
somewhere between 20 and 40 percent of the North Korean GDP, probably 
closer to the upper end of this range.”150 
· Second, “in contrast, in East Germany the military establishment was 
predominantly that of the Soviet Union. Although still imposing a burden on 
the GDR economy, most of the total costs were borne by the Soviet Union, 
while only a fraction of the proportion mentioned above was imposed on the 
GDR.”151 
Thus, shrinking the military establishment on both sides would substantial savings 
diminishing the South Korean financial burden. 
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E. LESSONS LEARNED 
Although the main concern of unification is the political union of the Korean 
peninsula, German unification sheds more light on the importance of economic 
exchanges and cooperation. Non-commercial exchanges or grants under favorable 
conditions are especially important for reducing political as well as economic 
confrontation. The West German people had to bear a heavy economic and financial 
burden of unification, similar to what South Korea will likely encounter. In the five years 
following German unification, its government poured $600 billion of public money into 
developing the East.152 That figure exceeds five percent of German GDP for that same 
period. Even if Korea’s tab is smaller, it could represent a greater share of its GDP. 
The German unification effort was hampered by two glaring errors that need not 
be repeated in Korea. One mistake that drastically increased the expense of German 
unification was the decision to permit a generous 1:1 exchange of East German Ostmarks 
for West German Deutschmarks. Ostmarks had traded at a 4:1 ratio prior to 
unification. 153 The generous exchange rate provided some short-term benefits by spurring 
consumption in the East and fostering eastern goodwill. However, East German wages 
did not remain low in real terms and the eastern economy proved not to be competitive. 
After unification, West German trade unions fought successfully to raise the pay 
of East German workers to a level closer to that of West German workers. This raise 
occurred despite the glaring productivity gap between workers in the two regions. The 
impact on German industry in the East was decidedly negative. The increase in labor 
costs made unemployment soar and discouraged foreign investment at a time when 
Germany needed it most to meet the costs of unification. 154 
The ROK could offer a generous but not ridiculously high conversion rate for the 
North Korean won. Currently the North Korean won is pegged to the U.S. dollar at about 
2.2:1.155 However, it is not a convertible currency. It is highly unlikely that it would trade 
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at anywhere near that rate on the open market. One exchange option is to use the black 
market rate as a guideline when one emerges in the immediate wake of unification. 156 In 
any event, the impact on the South Korean won will be minimal because North Koreans 
probably hold little hard currency as a result of periodic official currency sweeps 
conducted to flush out illegally earned cash. 157 
In determining a rate of exchange, both the state of the North Korean economy 
and the level of inflationary pressure in the South would have to be considered. A 
generous rate could have the desired effects of both spurring consumption in the North 
and fostering goodwill toward the ROK government and the South in general. It could 
also alleviate Northerners’ fear of being “absorbed” by the South. In the short term, it 
could ease the transition of Northerners into an economy where the quantity, quality and 
cost of goods are significantly higher than those to which they are accustomed. That 
action taken alone, while keeping wages in the North at levels commensurate with 
productivity, could ease the pain of economic restructuring and keep unification costs at 
more moderate levels compared to Germany, while at the same time encouraging much 
needed foreign investment.158 
The effort to return property expropriated by the former Communist government 
to its rightful owners or heirs proved to be another expensive policy of German 
unification. This raised the price tag on unification both directly and indirectly. The 
bureaucracy necessary for researching and documenting title to seized or transferred 
properties was considerable. Those cases where title was in dispute resulted in a drain on 
a court system already burdened by the difficulties of unification. In addition, the specter 
of questionable property titles delayed the privatization of East German government 
property, slowing the pace of investment.159 
Because the East German people were not accustomed to the free market system, 
they were forced into a difficult transition process, along with experiencing psychological 
frustration and unemployment. Through the transition process they had to overcome 
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many conflicts on the issue of equity and property ownership. 160 The same scenario will 
likely play out in Korea as the communist North Koreans become immersed into a 
capitalist system. This scenario can be reduced greatly, or even avoided, with increased 
economic cooperation and market-based reform prior to unification. 
Germany did unify peacefully, but does Ostpolitik deserve the credit for leading 
the two Germanys to political rapprochement? The policy stressed “liberalization through 
stabilization” with heavy emphasis on expanding trade and economic assistance from the 
West to the East. However, looking back following unification, Ostpolitik may have 
increased tensions between the two and may have led to many of the economic problems 
encountered following unification. Studies released shortly after unification show that 
East Germany’s military posture and aggressiveness toward the West was increased 
following the inception of Ostpolitik, vice being relaxed as previously believed. 
Economically, Eastern authorities abused the import of goods and products from the 
West by using them not as compliments to reform, but as substitutes. Ideologically, it has 
been discovered that Eastern state officials launched numerous programs in response to 
Ostpolitik in order to counter peaceful coexistence and further entrench the socialist 
ideology. Regardless, peaceful unification did take place, but is credited by some studies 
as being the result of a lack of independence on behalf of the East within the international 
community. The East only began to fall after Moscow declared that it would no longer 
support the East’s struggles with domestic issues. Under that pressure, the Eastern regime 
began to fail and reached toward the West as a result.161 
Research from the Korean Development Institute, one of Seoul’s most prominent 
economic think tanks, asserts “the German experience demonstrates that national 
unification involves enormous costs, and, going forward, this is probably the most critical 
concern for South Korea.”162 It also reported “the experience of German national 
unification convinced a large number of South Koreans that sudden economic integration 
in Korea…will result in disaster.”163  
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Selig Harrison notes the positive impact that prior economic cooperation, through 
Ostpolitik, had in the case of German unification. 
“It was the network of contacts and economic linkages between East and 
West Germany made possible by Ostpolitik over a twenty-five year period 
that set the stage for the upheaval triggered in the East by Gorbachev’s 
relaxation of the Soviet grip.”164 
It is further pointed out that the bulk of the cost of unification came in the form of social 
welfare payments. The high costs of unification were incurred through a collision 
between generous wage increases and new social insurance system. 165  
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VI. CASE STUDY: YEMEN 
The unification of Yemen, although small in scale, is an example of unification by 
negotiation. Two separate Yemeni states were created out of an artificial division by 
foreign influence in the region centuries before unification. Only after the foreign 
umbrella was removed did regional leaders formally create separate states based on 
ideological differences. Nevertheless, after nearly twenty years of negotiation and often 
sporadic fighting, Yemen unified. For nearly a century, Yemen has been a battlefield, 
with separatist groups vying for control of the different regions within the country. The 
fighting did cease in early 1990 when unification was ratified, but escalated into a civil 
war just four years after unification. Unlike Germany and Korea, Yemen is an extremely 
poor state and has not received much international attention or aid during its unification 
process.  
 
A. NORTH YEMEN 
North Yemen was a colonial state of the Ottoman Empire since the 16th century. 
Ottoman control of northern Yemen finally ended when Turkish forces withdrew from 
the area in 1918. Indigenous rule was then restored, as tribal leader Imam Yahya 
strengthened his control over north Yemen following the Turkish withdrawal. Yemen 
became a member of the Arab league in 1945 and the United Nations in 1947. Imam 
Yahya died during an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1948 and was succeeded by his son 
Ahmad, who ruled until his death in September 1962. Shortly after assuming power in 
1962, Ahmad's son, Badr, was deposed by revolutionary forces, which took control of the 
capital city of Sanaa and created the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). Egypt assisted the 
YAR with troops and supplies to combat forces loyal to Badr. Saudi Arabia and Jordan 
supported Badr's royalist forces to oppose the newly formed republic. Conflict continued 
periodically until 1967, when Egyptian troops were withdrawn. By 1968, following a 
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final royalist siege of Sanaa, most of the opposing leaders reached reconciliation and 
Saudi Arabia recognized the Republic in 1970.166  
 
B. SOUTH YEMEN 
The British successfully captured the southern port city of Aden in 1839, and thus 
assumed the colonial rule of South Yemen as part of British India until 1937. At that time 
Aden was made a crown colony, with the remaining land designated as east Aden and 
west Aden protectorates.167  
By 1965, most of the tribal states within the protectorates and the Aden colony 
proper had joined to form the British-sponsored Federation of South Arabia. In 1965, two 
rival nationalist groups, the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) 
and the National Liberation Front (NLF), turned to terrorism in their struggle to control 
the country. In 1967, in the face of uncontrollable violence, British troops began 
withdrawing, federation rule collapsed, and NLF elements took control after eliminating 
their FLOSY rivals.168  
South Arabia, including Aden, was declared independent on November 30, 1967, 
and was renamed the People's Republic of South Yemen. In June 1969, a radical wing of 
the Marxist NLF gained power and later changed the country's name on December 1, 
1970, to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). In the PDRY, all political 
parties were combined into the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), which became the only 
legal party. The PDRY established close ties with the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and 
radical Palestinians.169  
 
C. YEMENI UNIFICATION 
In 1972, the governments of the PDRY and the YAR declared that they approved 
a future union. However, little progress was made toward unification, and relations were 
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often strained. In 1979, simmering tensions led to fighting, which was only resolved after 
Arab League mediation. The northern and southern heads of state reaffirmed the goal of 
unity during a summit meeting in Kuwait in March 1979. The border wars between the 
two countries in 1972 and 1979 both had ended surprisingly with agreements for Yemeni 
unification, though in each case the agreement was quickly shelved.170  
Relations between the YAR and PDRY grew increasingly conciliatory after 1980. 
During the 1980s, the two countries cooperated increasingly in economic and 
administrative matters. However, in 1986 the fighting resumed as a violent struggle 
among factional leaders for regional dominance in Aden. Fighting lasted for more than a 
month and resulted in thousands of casualties.171  
In May 1988, the YAR and PDRY governments came to an understanding that 
considerably reduced tensions, including agreement to renew discussions concerning 
unification, to establish a joint oil exploration area along their undefined border, to 
demilitarize the border, and to allow Yemenis unrestricted border passage on the basis of 
only a national identification card. In December 1989, their respective leaders met and 
prepared a final unification agreement. On May 22, 1990, North and South Yemen 
officially merged to become the Republic of Yemen.  A 30-month transitional period for 
completing the unification of the two political and economic systems was set in 
motion. 172  
 
1. Civil War 
In May 1991 the populace ratified the unity constitution, which had been agreed 
upon in May 1990,. It affirmed Yemen's commitment to free elections, a multiparty 
political system, the right to own private property, equality under the law, and respect of 
basic human rights. Parliamentary elections were held on April 27, 1993. International 
groups assisted in the organization of the elections and observed actual balloting. 
However, conflicts within the coalition resulted in the self- imposed exile of the vice 
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president and deterioration in the general security situation, as political rivals settled 
scores and tribal elements took advantage of the unsettled situation. Continuous 
negotiations between northern and southern leaders resulted in the signing of the 
document of pledge and accord in Amman, Jordan on February 20, 1994. Despite this, 
clashes intensified until civil war broke out in early May 1994.173  
Almost all of the actual fighting in the 1994 civil war occurred in the southern 
part of the country despite air and missile attacks against cities and major installations in 
the north. Southerners sought support from neighboring states and received billions of 
dollars of equipment and financial assistance. Southern leaders declared secession and the 
establishment of the Democratic Republic of Yemen (DRY) on May 21, 1994, but the 
international community did not recognize the DRY. The northern forces greatly 
increased military operations against the secessionists and Aden was captured on July 7, 
1994. Other resistance quickly collapsed and thousands of southern leaders and military 
went into exile. Amendments to the unity constitution were quickly adopted that would  
alleviate conflict and strife and include greater cooperation among tribal and factional 
leaders allowing fair and equal participation in the government.174  
 
2. Economic Implications  
At unification, both the YAR and the PDRY were struggling, underdeveloped 
economies. In the north, disruptions of civil war (1962-70) and frequent periods of 
drought had dealt severe blows to a previously prosperous agricultural sector. Coffee 
production, formerly the north's main export and principal form of foreign exchange, 
declined as well during the period. Low domestic industrial output and a lack of raw 
materials made the YAR dependent on a wide variety of imports.175  
Remittances from Yemenis working abroad and foreign aid paid for perpetual 
trade deficits. Substantial Yemeni communities exist in many countries of the world, 
including Yemen's immediate neighbors on the Arabian Peninsula, Indonesia, India, East 
                                                 
173 Michael C Hudson, Regional Integration in the Arab World: Problems of Political and Economic 
Fragmentation. Columbia University Press: New York, 1998. p. 70-77. 
174 Hudson., 90-92. 
175 Carapico, Shelia. “The Economic Dimensions of Yemeni Unity,” Middle East Report, 184, (Sept/Oct 
1993), 58. 
57 
Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Beginning in the mid-1950s, the 
Soviet Union and China provided large-scale assistance to the YAR. This aid included 
funding of substantial construction projects, scholarships, and considerable military 
assistance.176  
In the south, pre- independence economic activity was overwhelmingly 
concentrated in the port city of Aden. The sea borne transit trade, which the port relied 
upon, collapsed with the closure of the Suez Canal and Britain's withdrawal from Aden in 
1967. Only extensive Soviet aid, remittances from south Yemenis working abroad, and 
revenues from the Aden refinery (built in the 1950s) kept the PDRY's centrally planned 
Marxist economy afloat. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and a cessation of 
Soviet aid, the south's economy basically collapsed.177  
Since unification, the government has worked to integrate two relatively disparate 
economic systems. By the summer of 1990, rising oil revenues and financial assistance 
from many foreign countries, including Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, brought 
hope that Yemen could begin to strengthen and expand its economy.  However, Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the events that followed in the Persian Gulf took a 
serious toll on Yemen’s economy and newfound political stability. Yemen’s critical 
response to the presence of foreign military forces massed in Saudi Arabia led the Saudi 
government to expel 850,000 Yemeni workers; the return of the workers and the loss of 
remittance payments produced widespread unemployment and economic upheaval, which 
led in turn to domestic political unrest.178  
Bomb attacks, political killings, and violent demonstrations occurred throughout 
1991 and 1992. Then in December 1992 a rise in consumer prices precipitated riots in 
several of Yemen’s major cities. Concern arose that declining economic and social 
conditions would give rise to Islamic fundamentalist activities in Yemen. Political 
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turmoil forced the government to postpone general elections, which were finally held on 
April 27, 1993, completing the Yemeni unification process begun three years earlier.179  
After the 1994 civil war, the Yemeni government was faced with the task of 
rebuilding Yemen’s economy and government. The infrastructure in and around Aden 
sustained the most damage, from water systems to oil refineries and communications 
centers. In July more than 100 cases of cholera were diagnosed in Aden, due in part to 
water shortages in the city. In an attempt to revive the country’s economy, Yemeni 
leaders made efforts to devise and implement an economic austerity program called for 
by several international economic agencies; this was achieved with a great deal of 
difficulty in the spring of 1995.180 
Since the conclusion of the civil war, the government entered into agreement with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to institute an extremely successful structural 
adjustment program. Phase one of the IMF program included major financial and 
monetary reforms, including floating the currency, reducing the budget deficit, and 
cutting subsidies. Phase two will address structural issues such as civil service reform. 181 
The World Bank also is active in Yemen, providing an $80-million loan in 1996.182 
Yemen has received debt relief from the Paris Club. Some military equipment is still 
purchased from former East bloc states and China, but on a cash basis. As a sign of 
growing economic recovery following unification and civil war, Yemen's oil exports in 
1995 earned about $1 billion and rose to nearly $2 billion in 2000.183 
 
D. LESSONS LEARNED 
Socialist South Yemen and capitalist North Yemen accomplished their unification 
through peaceful negotiations. Yemen achieved its unification without military conflict, 
although bloodshed was a historical norm prior to serious unification negotiations. The 
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Yemeni example shows the possibility that peaceful negotiations can solve very difficult 
political issues. However, Yemen failed to prevent a civil war after it was politically 
unified because it was unified hastily and superficially without having experienced a 
process of real reconciliation and cooperation. Yemen provides the lesson that unification 
without accumulated social, economic and political integration may bring inefficient 
results, as shown by the outbreak of civil war in Yemen just four years after unification.  
Although the strategic setting in Yemen is far different from Korea, Yemen’s 
unification process provides a grim example of the potential violence that can result from 
an attempt to prematurely merge two nations whose political systems are diametrically 
opposed. Considering Yemen’s experience, Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine policy” and the 
slow approach of incremental and gradual unification seem prudent choices. As far as 
economics are concerned, the lessons learned are those of lost opportunity. Today, it 
seems Yemen in on the right track to economic recovery. However, prior concentration 
on an economic union could have overshadowed political difference and the economic 
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VII. CASE STUDY: CHINA 
In late 1978, the Chinese leadership began moving the economy from a sluggish 
centrally planned system to a market-oriented system. Since then, China has adopted a 
pragmatic perspective on many political and socioeconomic problems and has sharply 
reduced the role of ideology in economic policy. Political and social stability and 
economic productivity are considered paramount. The government has emphasized 
raising personal income and consumption and introducing new management systems to 
help increase productivity. The government also has focused on foreign trade as a major 
vehicle for economic growth.  
However, the Chinese economic system operates within a political framework of 
strict Chinese communist control, but the economic influence of non-state managers and 
enterprises has been steadily increasing. The authorities have switched to a system of 
household responsibility in agriculture in place of the old collectivization, increased the 
authority of plant managers in industry, permitted a wide variety of small-scale enterprise 
in services and light manufacturing, and opened the economy to increased foreign trade 
and investment. The result has been a quadrupling of GDP since 1978.  
 
A. DENG XIAOPING’S REFORMS 
Chairman Mao Zedong led communist China from its inception in 1949, when his 
communist forces defeated the nationalist and formed the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), until his death in 1976. Under his leadership, the PRC economy was completely 
collectivized under the mantle of Marxist-Leninist ideology, but with Chinese 
characteristics. However, Mao’s effort to communize China economically had serious 
social consequences. Numerous programs enacted under Mao’s leadership made the later 
reform effort much more difficult. . 
In 1978, the PRC President Deng Xiaoping re-established power and 
implemented his “four modernizations” in agriculture, industry, science and technology, 
and national defense. China developed from an agrarian economy into an industrial 
powerhouse. This growth is one of the greatest economic phenomena of the  twentieth 
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century, rivaling the United States’ emergence in the early part of the century and the 
post World War II recoveries of Japan and Germany. 184 
China’s economic growth that followed stemmed from reforms that include a 
combination of large capital investments, both from international and domestic sources; 
an increasingly productive labor force; and market oriented changes that increase profit 
incentives. These factors combine to give China positive long-term prospects. In the two 
decades that followed Deng’s reform movement began, the Chinese economy grew at a 
rate of roughly 9 percent per year.185 
The first phase of Deng’s reform (1978-1983) movement was designed to counter 
existing institutional factors that inhibited productivity. The significant reforms adopted 
include: 
· Land leased to farmers under the household responsibility system. 
· Higher procurement prices for key crops. 
· Introduction of the two-track price system. 
· Attract foreign investment. 
· Promote exports. 
· Scale back the planning system for state owned enterprises (SOEs). 
· Link bonuses more closely to performance. 
· Establish tighter links between wages and productivity. 
The agricultural sector was the jumping off point for PRC reforms. This area was 
underdeveloped in 1978 and offered a prime opportunity for quick results. Increases in 
agricultural efficiency would also generate required savings rates and provide a source of 
surplus labor from displaced farm workers. Initial agricultural reforms were successful, 
increasing both total output and productivity. 186  
In addition, Deng initiated an “open” policy, establishing special economic zones 
(SEZ’s) to stimulate trade with foreign markets. In these zones ownership, tax, 
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investment, material, and wage policies were instituted that would make the areas 
receptive to Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). There was also a reallocation of resources, 
which emphasized the profitable consumer-goods industries instead of the input- intensive 
heavy industry. This produced an increase in manufacturing productivity and bolstered 
the consumer goods available. The growth experienced in the first phase of reforms was 
consumption led, as the consumer goods sector showed quick returns based on the short 
time from production to consumption. 187  
The second phase of Deng’s reform effort (1984-1991) was marked by a shift to 
reforms in the urban sector and industry, which took advantage of the increased savings 
and surplus labor that resulted from the rural reforms. Some of the significant reforms 
include: 
· Grant SOEs more autonomy in production/employment decisions. 
· Extensions of two-track system to industrial prices. 
· Other types of enterprises (such as urban collectives) gain importance. 
· Bank reform, including the establishment of the People’s Bank as the central 
bank. 
· Enterprises could retain larger share of profits. 
· Enterprise tax introduced to replace profit transfers. 
· Number of SEZ’s expanded.  
· Foreign trade plan scaled back.  
· Swap centers for the trading of retained exchange. 
· Further increases in decentralization. 
These reforms led to average annual rates of growth of 10 percent in agricultural and 
industrial output. Rural per capita real income doubled. China became self-sufficient in 
grain production; rural industries accounted for 23 percent of agricultural output, helping 
absorb surplus labor in the countryside. The variety of light industrial and consumer 
goods increased. Reforms began in the fiscal, financial, banking, price setting, and labor 
systems. 188 
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The second phase’s reforms marked a drastic increase in growth of the non-state 
sector and with it came increased overall economic growth. This growth brought about a 
decrease in macroeconomic controls and, in turn, increased inflationary pressures usually 
associated with an overheating economy. This brought on the need for reforms designed 
to improve the financial infrastructure. In addition, a “rectification” period saw the 
slowing of reforms designed to lessen inflationary pressures.  
The third phase of Deng’s reform effort (since 1992) was marked with reforms in 
foreign trade, taxation and investment. This represented a significant shift away from a 
planned system in favor of a market economy. The major area of focus however, was in 
policy concerning SOEs. The system of contracting for SOEs was modernized to increase 
efficiency. The significant reforms adopted include: 
· Market forces dedicated to playing a primary role in resource allocation. 
· Strengthen and develop infrastructure for better macroeconomic control. 
· Widening central bank reforms. 
· Widening of financial sectors. 
· Fiscal system improved. 
· Exchange and trade system improved. 
· Accelerate SOE reforms. 
China's economy gained substantial momentum in the early 1990s. During a visit to 
southern China in early 1992, Deng made a series of political pronouncements designed 
to reinvigorate the process of economic reform. The 14th Party Congress later in the year 
backed Deng's renewed push for market reforms, stating that China's key task in the 
1990s was to create a "socialist market economy." The 10-year development plan for the 
1990s stressed continuity in the political system with bolder reform of the economic 
system. 189  
During 1993, output and prices were accelerating, investment outside the state 
budget was soaring, and economic expansion was fueled by the introduction of more than 
2,000 SEZ's and the influx of foreign capital that the SEZ’s facilitated. Fearing 
hyperinflation, Chinese authorities called in speculative loans, raised interest rates, and 
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re-evaluated investment projects. The growth rate was thus tempered, and the inflation 
rate dropped from over 17 percent in 1995 to 8 percent in early 1996. In 1996, the 
Chinese economy continued to grow at a rapid pace, at about 9.5 percent, accompanied 
by low inflation. The economy slowed for the next 3 years, with official growth of 8.9 
percent in 1997, 7.8 percent in 1998 and 7.1 percent for 1999. The year 2000 showed a 
modest reversal of this trend. Gross domestic product in 2000 grew officially at 8.0 
percent that year.190  
 
B. SOURCES OF GROWTH IN THE PRC ECONOMY 
Agricultural growth provided a larger portion of non-state sector growth from 
1978 to 1984 than from 1984 to 1993. This is indicative of a one-time boost in 
productivity experienced in the first years after reforms established household farming 
units.191  During the pre-reform period, a significant amount of the agricultural labor was 
underemployed. This is significant because as workers moved into the industry and 
service sectors their activities became a more important source of productivity growth. In 
1978, agricultural employment was more than 70 percent of the workforce, this fell to 54 
percent in 1994.192 This shift enabled a dramatic rise in the number of non-state 
enterprises over the reform period. Tens of millions of the displaced workers moved to 
the value added manufacturing sector where they were more productive. China’s non-
state sector of the economy grew much faster than the state sector, which is comprised of 
many SOEs.  
The establishment of SEZ’s attracted large amounts of FDI, which had been 
almost zero in the pre-1979 period. By 1994, cumulative FDI reached $95.6 billion. 193 
Furthermore, the joint ventures and foreign owned enterprises received significant 
technological and managerial expertise spillover from outside of the system. These 
ventures produced items that transferred China into an export powerhouse. This indicates 
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that the PRC economy was in a position for reforms to increase productivity and to spur 
growth. Beyond privatization and agricultural reform, China experienced considerable 
growth in the export sector. This is similar to models of other Asian countries. The export 
sector optimized the growing liberalization of China’s private enterprise, since many 
exports come form the non-state sector. Exports from private enterprises were often 
financed with foreign investment.194  
It is important to note that PRC economic growth increased immediately after the 
initiation of reforms. Credit is given to foreign trade the gradual pace of program 
implementation helped the move toward privatization, fostering competition and 
therefore, efficiency. While increases in labor and capital inputs did contribute significant 
growth during the reform period, the largest portion of growth was caused by increases in 
productivity.  
In addition, China has taken steps to decentralize its foreign trading system and 
integrate itself into the world trading system. In November 1991, China joined the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group, which promotes free trade and cooperation 
in the economic, trade, investment, and techno logy spheres. China formally joined the 
WTO in December 2001. Accession marks the end of a 16-year cycle of negotiations. As 
part of this far-reaching trade liberalization agreement, China agreed to lower tariffs and 
abolish market impediments after it joins the WTO. Chinese and foreign businessmen, for 
example, will gain the right to import and export on their own, and to sell their products 
without going through a government middleman. 195  
Opening to the outside remains central to China's development. Foreign- invested 
enterprises produce about 45 percent of China's exports, and China continues to attract 
large investment inflows. Since 1992, China has been the world's second- largest recipient 
of foreign direct investment after the United States. Foreign exchange reserves totaled 
about $165 billion in 2000. 196 
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C. LESSONS LEARNED 
Since the economic reform movement began in the late 1970s, China has 
achieved tremendous economic successes. From 1979 until 1992, China’s economy grew 
at an average rate of 9 percent, reaching as high as 12 percent.197 In 2000, with its 1.26 
billion people but a GDP of just $3,600 per capita, China stood as the second largest 
economy in the world after the US (measured on a purchasing power parity basis).198 
Agricultural output doubled in the 1980s, and industry also posted major gains, especially 
in coastal areas near Hong Kong and opposite Taiwan, where foreign investment helped 
spur output of both domestic and export goods. On the darker side, the leadership has 
often experienced in its hybrid system the worst results of socialism (bureaucracy and 
lassitude) and of capitalism (windfall gains and stepped-up inflation). Beijing thus has 
periodically backtracked, retightening central controls at intervals. 
 
1. Similarities To Korea 
The World Bank produced a 1992 report that outlined China’s economy before 
Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 reforms. The report noted that the PRC system at this time was 
atypical of the standard Soviet model and other reforming socialist systems. The most 
important differences were in the areas of health and education. This gave the PRC an 
advantage that would make the difference between PRC growth and the Soviet bloc’s 
problems in the decades to follow. Furthermore, the World Bank noted that China was 
not in a position of macroeconomic financial crisis in 1977 “which removed the need for 
a strong dose of deflationary policy to accompany the launching of reforms.”199 This is a 
striking difference to the situation that exists in North Korea today. 
Nicholas Eberstadt further points out some of the key differences between the 
Chinese reform effort and the current outlook for North Korea. 
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· First, “China’s economic opening followed a change in the country’s supreme 
leadership. It was only with the consolidation of power by Deng Xiaoping that 
the move toward markets commenced.” 
· Second, “Beijing’s leadership has indicated its confidence not only in the 
permanence of its new approach to trade but also in its ability to withstand the 
destabilizing turbulence unleashed by increased contacts with citizens from 
the state with which it is locked in a battle for legitimacy.” 
· Third, “China’s rulers embarked upon relaxation of direct administrative 
controls over interactions with the international economy almost at the outset 
of the process of economic opening.” 200 
The counter-argument is striking and clearly evident. In North Korea, no change in 
leadership is envisioned or expected. If anything, Kim Jong-il has entrenched his grasp 
since his father’s death in 1994. Contact with South Korea has expanded since 1991, and 
even more so since the 2000 summit, but is still closely apportioned. An influx of societal 
contact with the South, regardless of the means, would be closely countenanced. And 
finally, the DPRK has given no indication that it wishes to relinquish control over any 
aspect of the economy, internally or externally.201 
The economic reform example set by China should impress upon the Pyongyang 
leadership that a system-level reform effort in North Korea is not only possible, but also 
predictably successful. China’s economic growth following the reform movement set a 
global record for doubling per capita output in the shortest period, accomplishing the feat 
in only ten years, 1977-1987.202 By 1992, China, based on the World Bank’s estimates of 
purchasing-power-parity, became the world’s third largest economy, up from a rank of 
near 30 just twenty years earlier.203 However, China’s reform movement has come with 
social and domestic problems, which present the greatest obstacle for the North Korean 
regime in regard to economic reform. Nevertheless, China has moved forward 
economically with systematic reforms of its economic policy and is now facing the social 
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consequences which it vows to attend to with a large focus, all the while maintaining 
continuity within the leadership structure. 
A major difference between China and North Korea, with regard to leadership, is 
the difference in philosophies, ability, and timing. The post-Mao leadership in China, led 
by Deng Xiaoping, is not comparable to the post-Kim Il-sung leadership in North Korea, 
led by Kim Jong- il. The timing of the change in leadership in China helped spur the 
reform movement largely because it was at the height of the Cold War and the reflective 
anti-Soviet sentiment helped support China’s acceptance into the world economy. Today, 
North Korea is treated at arms length by most world leaders and continues to align itself 
with countries usually regarded as rogue and dangerous. At the time of the reform 
movement in China, the leadership was confronted with following ten years of social 
degradation at the hands of the Cultural Revolution, which made any hint of reform 
extremely popular. Deng, as quoted below, made use of this opportunity with which to 
announce and legitimize economic reform and opening to the global market. 
“To accelerate China’s modernization we must not only make use of other 
countries’ experience. We must also avail ourselves of foreign funding. In 
past years, international conditions worked against us. Later, when the 
international climate was favorable, we did not take advantage of it. It is 
now time to use our opportunities.”204 
North Korea, on the other hand, continues to staunchly voice its adherence to the Juche 
philosophy of self- reliance. All efforts to begin invoking reform have both failed and 
been abandoned, or have not received the proper support and attention needed to succeed. 
The North also has made little or no effort, aside from pleas for food and aid, to reach out 
and invite the world in as China did and continues to do. 
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VIII. CASE STUDY: VIETNAM 
In the 25 years since the end of the Vietnam War, Vietnamese society, economy, 
and polity have been remade several times. Vietnam, once ostracized by its neighbors and 
the world community for attempting to spread its hegemony to neighboring Cambodia, 
has forsaken its Stalinist planned economy, ended its costly foray into Cambodia, 
embraced its neighbors by joining the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), normalized relations with the United States, and reintegrated into the global 
capitalist system. Yet, like China, Vietnam remains a communist state. 
Reforms during the 1980s took Vietnam from a planned economy to a market 
economy, creating a mixed system that ended the economic crisis. When the economy 
started turning around, Hanoi again tried to implement a command economy throughout 
the country. Further domestic resistance (especially from the peasants), the strains of war 
in Cambodia, and the potential loss of Soviet patronage all led the Communist Party to 
reverse its policies and begin its vaunted Doi Moi (“renovation”) program in late 1986. 
Originally envisioned as a program of gradual economic and political reforms, local 
accommodations and the actions of state-owned enterprise (SOE) managers transformed 
Doi Moi. By the end of the decade, the command economy had been scrapped in favor of 
a capitalist market that increasingly integrated into the global system.  
During the 1990s economic reforms accelerated in return for continued 
communist political control. To replace the massive assistance lost when Soviet 
communism collapsed, Vietnam turned to its Asian neighbors, the United States, and the 
international marketplace. Once open to the world, the forces of internationalization 
began to influence Vietnam’s economic development. 
 
A. TRANSITION TO THE MARKET 
Hanoi entered the 1980s in the midst of grave crises that challenged Communist 
party rule. Southern resistance to the collectivization of agriculture and industry, along 
with peasant resistance nationwide, further forced the first generation of Vietnamese 
communist leaders into compromise reforms. These 1979 reforms ameliorated the food 
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crisis by slowing the expansion of the Marxist-Leninist command economy nationwide. 
Although partially successful, the 1979 reforms did not correct Vietnam’s economic 
problems. Incentives at the local level to accommodate practical work-arounds, family-
based agricultural production and additional “fence breaking,” made the broken economy 
work. The interaction of grassroots work-arounds with periodic attempts by Hanoi to 
clamp down on the free market generated new rules of the game, allowing unplanned 
activities to become legal.205 In a similar vein, state employees were forced to create their 
own work-arounds by increasingly turning to the market for food and extra wages to 
offset scarcities, lost subsidies, and galloping inflation. All of this unofficial activity 
created a de facto commercialization of the economy that further reduced the monopoly 
power of the state.206  
In response, a new system of enterprise management was announced in January 
1981. Called the “three plan system,” it merged the conventional planned economy with 
some of the elements of fence breaking. A SOE was allowed in essence to operate on 
three levels (“plans”). Plan A production was the old Marxist-Leninist plan – SOEs used 
state subsidized inputs to produce their quota of outputs sold at a low price to the state 
distribution system. Plan B allowed the SOE to acquire additional inputs on its own and 
to sell production above quota in order to pay for the unplanned inputs. Plan C allowed 
the SOE to diversify into new unplanned products to meet untouched consumer demand. 
Since the inputs for this diversified production came from the market, Plan C production 
was unregulated, but state trading companies were given priority in disposing the new 
production. 207 Units outside the state system – private enterprises and collective artisan 
producers – were allowed to contract for production using a system similar to the 
agricultural product contract system. In addition, enterprises were given the option to 
adopt a piece-rate system for employee wages to spur labor productivity. 208 
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In early 1983, steep taxes were levied on private enterprises deemed inessential, 
causing many to close or be taken over by the state. A new agricultural tax system was 
also introduced that favored collectives with lower fixed rates on yields. In an attempt to 
end fence breaking, Hanoi again required enterprises to buy and sell through state organs. 
The agricultural collectivization drive, held in abeyance since 1979, was resumed, with a 
new goal of complete collectivization by the end of 1985.209 However, as the decade 
progressed the state became increasingly involved in this process, cut subsidies, and 
dramatically raised wages and prices. Vietnam financed these policies by ever widening 
deficits, touching off high inflation. Meanwhile, the Hanoi tried to gain greater control 
over the retail market and private capital accumulation by introducing currency reform; 
creating a new dong (equivalent to 10 old dong) and severely limiting the quantity of old 
currency, which could be converted.210 This led to greater shortages of consumer goods at 
the same time that workers had been given significant raises – precipitating 
hyperinflation. 211  
 
1. Doi Moi 
In December 1986, Vietnam began in earnest its transition to the market. At the 
micro level Doi Moi adopted many of the innovations that Mekong delta family farmers, 
Red River cooperatives, fence-breaking managers, entrepreneurs, and their local cadre 
partners had been using to work around the problems of the central planning system. At 
the macro-level, the reforms were facilitated by shifts in regional and global balances of 
power, as well as in Vietnamese society. Foreseeing an end to Soviet aid, unwilling again 
to become a Chinese vassal, and unable to attract Washington as a new patron, Hanoi was 
forced to look to its Asian neighbors and the international market for capital, creating a 
new major class of stakeholders for reform, foreign capitalists. 
In early 1987, significant free market and private enterprise concessions were 
made in Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi, and other areas. Internal customs posts were closed in 
order to improve the flow of goods. At several party plenums, liberal ideas were codified 
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into policies on foreign investment, land tenure, foreign trade, foreign investment, 
industrial management, the private sector, the family sector, etc.212 Unfortunately, the 
economy failed to respond quickly to the reforms, and by late 1987 a sharp drop in 
agricultural staples output caused further deterioration.  
In April 1988, Hanoi shifted most production management from the collective to 
the household. Collective lands countrywide were to be divvied up between families, who 
were given responsibility for the entire production process. The more productive farmers 
were to be allocated additional land. A new contract system was established with fixed 
five year terms and a guarantee that the families could keep at least 40 percent of the 
contracted yield. Acquisition of inputs and services from sources outside of the collective 
was legalized, and families could hire seasonal labor on a negotiated basis. Prices of all 
inputs and outputs were also to be negotiated – signaling an official turn towards the 
market. Tax concessions were made so as long-term crops and forestry resources were 
not taxed until harvested. The cooperative was to be transformed into a service entity – 
retaining ownership of irrigation equipment and other resources that would benefit all the 
families in the area, providing agricultural extension and social services, and helping to 
insure access to credit.213 
Hanoi also began to modify the “three plan system” of state enterprise 
management making firms more market sensitive. Under the new reforms, centrally 
planned control was de-emphasized, and Hanoi began to refer to itself as the “manager” 
of the economy. As manager, the state began to establish the independence of economic 
units from the administrative system. The first major change was adopting the capitalist 
definition of profits as revenue less real costs, instead of the socialist definition as a 
planned percentage markup over approved input costs.214 Other decrees began to slowly 
dismantle the state planning system by consolidating ministries, reducing central control, 
eliminating subsidized inputs and planned production for most enterprises. Instead of 
planned quotas and profit targets, these enterprises were given tax targets.215 
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With commercialization came the need for capital. There were two significant 
changes that gave birth to capital markets and the loosening of state control over credit. 
The first was a new foreign investment law promulgated in December 1987, and the 
second was the development of a new State bank and commercial banks in 1988 and a 
substantial shift to self- financing by state enterprises.216 The latter recognized the credit 
creation aspect of fence breaking, while the former met some of the credit need with new, 
more enterprise-friendly banks. The 1987 law, on the other hand, allowed for up to 100 
percent foreign ownership, as compared to 49 percent under the 1977 law, remittance of 
profits, and repatriation of capital after sale or liquidation subject to a remittance tax. 217 
 
2. The End Of The Cold War 
Many events came together in 1989 to change the world. Vietnam was deeply 
affected by the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and decay within the Soviet 
Union. Shocked that fraternal communist parties could not control the events let loose by 
glasnost and perestroika, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) began to look at its 
own policies.218 The last major element of the planned economy was demolished in 
March 1989, when Hanoi accelerated price reforms by abolishing the “two price system” 
of official business prices and free market prices in order to stem resurgent inflation. At 
the same time, the borders were opened, and high-quality imported consumer goods 
(mainly from China and Vietnam’s Southeast Asian neighbors) began to flood into the 
country. With the exception of a few social items such as electricity, housing rents, 
medicines, and a few others, state subsidies were dropped. Markets generally shifted into 
supply and demand balance, and Vietnam’s capitalist system was reborn. 219 
While Vietnam was accelerating economic change, it was also embarking on an 
ambitious new foreign policy. As Moscow openly courted Beijing, Hanoi had little 
choice but to improve its relations with its large northern neighbor as well.220 As a 
gesture of goodwill, Vietnam hastened its withdrawal from Cambodia, claiming that all 
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troops had left by the end of September, a full three months earlier than promised. 
Concurrently, Hanoi lobbied to improve relations with its ASEAN neighbors, Taiwan, 
Japan, and the United States in the hope that improved ties would lead to increased aid 
and investment. 
 
B. THE MARKET AND COMMUNISM  
By 1990, the mixture of policies adopted by a weak Hanoi in response to strong 
domestic and international pressures for liberal economic reform led to a dramatic 
reinvention of the economy. Totally unprepared, the communist party leadership found 
itself in the awkward position of governing a capitalist economy, albeit one with several 
distortions that were vestiges of the defunct planned system. While professing the 
importance of the household farm and small private enterprise to the new Vietnam, Hanoi 
stuck to the Stalinist preference for SOEs and industrial development. State credit 
policies were also skewed in favor of the SOEs, much to the detriment of the countryside 
where over three quarters of the population live. Nonetheless, agricultural growth has 
been rather strong. The impressive gains in agricultural productivity – around 4 percent 
per year – came almost solely from family savings and reinvestment.221 At the same time 
shifts in the global and regional balances of power left Hanoi without its superpower 
patron. Hanoi’s need to replace Soviet aid with foreign capital drove a policy of 
reconciliation with its ASEAN neighbors, China, and the United States.222 
 
1. Losing Soviet Support 
In 1990 Moscow informed Hanoi that aid would be cut drastically in 1991 and 
that all commercial relations would be conducted in hard currency at world market prices. 
As the Soviet Union imploded in 1990, Moscow was unable to meet its commitments to 
provide vital supplies, such as petroleum, oil, steel, and cotton, severely hampering 
Vietnamese industry. Meanwhile, Soviet enterprises backed out of between 20 to 60 
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percent of their contracts to purchase Vietnamese textiles, clothes, shoes, handicrafts and 
light industrial products. In turn, Vietnam defaulted on over a quarter of its contracts.223 
As a result of the long expected break, unemployment and inflation increased. 
Shortfalls in the supply of Soviet fertilizer caused a drop in rice production and a 
doubling of the market price. Oil and steel prices tripled. When Moscow demanded that 
Vietnam pay dollar salaries for all of the Soviet experts and technicians in the country, 
Hanoi balked and Moscow began to pull them out, nearly halving their number by mid-
1991. Trade with the Former Soviet Union dropped dramatically - from a high of over 60 
percent of total Vietnamese foreign trade in the 1980s to 50 percent in 1990 and 14 
percent in 1991.224 At the end of 1991, the International Monetary Fund estimated that 
the loss of Soviet and East European aid amounted to 7 percent of Vietnamese GDP. 225 
 
2. Embracing China, ASEAN, And The United States 
To make up for these dramatic loses, Hanoi scrambled to improve relations with 
its neighbors. Yet, even though Hanoi had withdrawn its troops from Cambodia in 
September 1989, Vietnam was still blocked by the United States- led international 
embargo from rapprochement with ASEAN and China. In July 1990 the United States 
announced it was dropping its support of the coalition in Cambodia and was willing to 
negotiate with Vietnam for peace in the region, Hanoi now had the opening it needed to 
patch up in short order differences with its neighbors. Secret meetings with the Chinese 
leadership in September 1990 led to normalization in November 1991.226 ASEAN's anti-
Vietnam stance soon crumbled after Indonesia normalized relations in November 
1990.227 Rapprochement with the other five ASEAN states quickly followed. French 
observers Jean- Claude Pomonti and Hugues Tetrais noted: 
“The reorientation of Vietnamese diplomacy, brutally cut off from Soviet 
support, was radical…the turn-around – and what a turn-around – 
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occurred in the space of one year. Vietnam's integration into regional 
economic relations took place much more rapidly than anyone could have 
dreamed, as if once it started, there was no way to stop it.”228 
Vietnam’s rapprochement with its neighbors paid real dividends. Total approved 
FDI grew from $366 million in 1988 to over $1.9 billion in 1992, with over one sixth of 
the funds coming from ASEAN states.229 By 1996, ASEAN accounted for 40 percent of 
FDI.230 Vietnamese-ASEAN trade grew from a meager $86 million in 1988 to more than 
$2.6 billion in 1992 to approximately $5 billion in 1997 – 6.5 percent, 31 percent, and 30 
percent respectively of Vietnam’s trade.231 Trade with China also skyrocketed after the 
border was opened in late 1988. From an estimated $l0 million in 1988, Sino-Vietnamese 
trade increased after normalization of relations to $584 million, or 8.8 percent of total 
Vietnamese trade, in 1992 and about $1 billion in 1995, or 9 percent of total trade.232  
Vietnam formalized its ties to ASEAN by becoming a full- fledged member in 
1995, bringing the organization full circle from being a predominantly anti-Vietnam 
association of Southeast Asian capitalist economies to being a truly regional economic 
confederation. It also symbolized Hanoi’s reintegration into the global marketplace. With 
the accession of Laos in 1997 and Cambodia in April 1999, Vietnam too went full circle, 
becoming, instead of the local hegemon, an equal partner with the rest of Indochina in 
ASEAN. 
Securing American partners to balance against Chinese interests in the disputed 
South China Sea was not the only dividend of improved relations with the United States. 
Washington’s support was also crucial to Hanoi for obtaining needed international 
development assistance. IMF, World Bank, and Asian development Bank projects were 
put on hold in the 1980s when the U.S. Congress threatened to withhold American 
contributions if the international organizations continued to aid Vietnam after its invasion 
of Cambodia. Hanoi subsequently defaulted on IMF loans, making future aid nearly 
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impossible. In July 1993 the United States dropped its opposition and the IMF, World 
Bank, and Asian Development Bank followed by planning to release over $885 million 
for approved infrastructure projects.233 
Although Hanoi had made great strides in getting Washington to drop American 
opposition to aid and the longstanding economic embargo, its efforts were incomplete 
until it could establish diplomatic relations with Washington. For Hanoi, American 
recognition was an important emblem of the new Vietnam’s successful integration in the 
world system. In July 1995, President Clinton finally felt that he had sufficient support 
from the business community and other interested parties to overcome the opposition of 
many conservatives and veterans for the normalization of relations. The process was 
completed in 1996 with the establishment of embassies in the two capitals and the 
exchange of ambassadors. 
 
3. The Asian Economic Crisis 
Compared with its Southeast Asian neighbors, especially Thailand and Indonesia, 
Vietnam has weathered the Asian economic crisis rather well. Unlike the deep recession 
that faced Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and South Korea, Vietnam experienced a 
relatively slight contraction. The major reasons were a relatively stable currency, a high 
degree of confidence in domestic banks, and the lack of an open capital market.234 After 
turning the economy around in the early 1990s with the assistance of massive foreign aid 
and investment, Vietnam was enjoying an average annual growth of between 8 and 9 
percent before the crisis.235 Poverty was down by a third between 1986 and 1996.236 
Exports grew even faster, but still were not approaching the high levels of imports, 
causing a large trade deficit that became a brake on the economy as other aspects of the 
regional crisis began to be felt.237 
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With the advent of the Asian crisis, Vietnamese growth fell off sharply to an 
estimated 3 to 5 percent in 1998.238 Exports dropped for the first time in many years. 
Manufacturers who were producing low cost goods for sale in the region found their 
market dry up. Tourism fell to a trickle. Government revenues were also down and SOEs 
were wracking up higher losses, causing Hanoi to postpone several large infrastructure 
projects.239 Unemployment jumped to an official 6 percent, but more likely much higher 
as SOEs began to lay off employees.240 Weakness in Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Thailand, 
and Indonesia adversely affected both FDI and development aid flows (both from 
regional and international sources). Realized FDI in 1998 was down over 50 percent from 
the year before, while new investment - predominantly Asian in the past - nearly ceased, 
falling 60 percent in the first ten months of 1998 after having fallen 50 percent in 1997.241  
 
C. LESSONS LEARNED 
Vietnam is a poor, densely populated country that has had to recover from the 
ravages of war, the loss of financial support from the old Soviet Bloc, and the rigidities of 
a centrally planned economy. Substantial progress was achieved from 1986 to 1996 in 
moving forward from an extremely low starting point – growth averaged around 9 
percent per year from 1993 to 1997.242 The 1997 Asian financial crisis highlighted the 
problems in the Vietnamese economy but, rather than prompting reform it reaffirmed the 
government's belief that shifting to a market oriented economy leads to disaster.  
Rapprochement with the capitalist West and Asia paved the way for the growing 
influence of internationalization on the Vietnamese economy. Foreign investment – 
mainly in joint ventures with SOEs – became a major force in the economy, accounting 
for nearly one-third of all industrial output in 1998.243 With the foreign funds came 
increased pressure to liberalize the economy, as investors pushed for more transparency, 
legal reform, and administrative reform. 
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While Vietnam and U.S. companies welcomed normalization of economic and 
political relations, it did not produce the American investment flows that Hanoi desired. 
Vietnam’s endemic corruption, inadequate laws, bureaucratic red tape, and the Asian 
economic crisis have kept American investment relatively low, especially compared to 
the funds coming from Vietnam’s overseas Chinese connections. 244 
The largest concern during the reform movement has been regime survival. The 
biggest threat to the regime is a wellspring of discontent among those who feel they are 
being bypassed by Vietnam’s economic growth. The population has accepted the premise 
that “first that the economy will perform better under a market regime that it did under 
central command, and second that improved performance will translate into measurable 
improvements in consumption and living standards.245 What the Vietnamese have not 
accepted is the widespread corruption, which unfairly enriches the local cadres and their 
families. Regardless, as long as the party delivers on an improved economy and lifestyle, 
the population seems to tolerate party rule. Former British Ambassador to Vietnam Derek 
Tonkin explains. 
“There is a concordat between the Party and the population that the Party 
will govern with a light touch of the reins and without cracking the whip, 
while the people have something of a heyday in seeking material 
improvement after so many years of struggle and sacrifice.”246 
Even the poorest farmers claim that life now is better than it was during the hardships of 
war and reunification. The only major complaints of the masses seem to be anger over 
corruption at the local level. 
 
1. Similarities to Korea 
For Vietnam, an indicator of the success of economic reform was the existence of 
a large, labor-intensive agricultural sector. De-bureaucratization of agriculture permitted 
rapid increases in productivity and the release of labor into the emerging non-state owned 
manufacturing sector. The farmers’ incomes went up as marginal and average value 
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product in the agricultural sector increased. The incomes of those leaving the farms rose 
as they receive higher wage jobs in the manufacturing sector and urban workers in the 
state-owned heavy industry sector benefited as their real wages rose as a result of lower 
food prices. The efficiency gains in agriculture essentially financed an economy-wide 
improvement. North Korea, however, has only about half the share of its labor force 
engaged in the agricultural sector (33 percent), as did Vietnam (71 percent) at the time 
that they commenced reforms. In terms of its composition of output, North Korea more 
closely resembles parts of Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union than it does 
Vietnam when they initiated reform. 247  
In comparison to Vietnam, the more industrialized character of the North Korean 
economy and the apparent loss of control by the central planners suggest that reform is 
more likely to be a relatively more chaotic process. The counter is that the North Korean 
economy has sunk so far that incumbent enterprises, workers, and elites will accept any 
reform as potentially welfare-enhancing. In any event, it appears that the regime retains 
considerable coercive powers and capacity for suppressing dissent. The most successful 
outcome, at least as measured as contributing to long-term regime stability, would be the 
successful implementation of economic reform. The example of Vietnam has 
demonstrated the possibility of introducing reforms into centrally planned economies 
while maintaining regime stability for extended periods of time. The process of internal 
change could be reinforced by positive external developments that would support this 
process politically and financially. 248  
Nonetheless, there is growing evidence that North Korea is beginning to 
undertake some economic reform measure similar to those experienced in Vietnam. It is 
reported that North Korea has reduced the size of agricultural production teams from 10-
24 persons to 5-7, slightly larger than the average size of one household. The production 
teams are also granted more discretionary power in selecting the type of product to grow 
in light of comparative advantage, which certainly means a weakening of central 
planning. Moreover, the North Korean regime has substantially reduced production 
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quotas for rural areas, and any outputs above the quotas are left with the producers to 
dispose of as they please.249 
Similar changes are taking place in North Korean industry. As was the case in 
Vietnam during its initial stage of reform, North Korea is now expanding enterprise 
autonomy by decentralizing decision making to the basic unit and top managers, who are 
sometimes elected by the workers. Now the North Korean regime encourages the 
industrial enterprises to seek practical benefits and must be in the process of devising 
more powerful incentive schemes for the basic units and its staffs and workers. This is an 
important part of the effort to expand the vocabulary, concepts, and ideas of the market 
economy. It is also reported that the North is attempting to successfully restructure its 
legal framework to attract more foreign investment, which along with the growing effort 
to renew or begin diplomatic ties with a large number of countries, shows significant 
proof that the North Korean regime has the potential to reform, but in many ways lacks 
the ability. This is because of a lack of education and exposure, of which the South could 
easily supply. 250 
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“The final failure of the North Korean state is not something that external 
actors could forestall, even if they were so inclined. But the manner in 
which the DPRK departs can be influenced, and how it departs world 
politics matters greatly, both within Korea and beyond.”251 
- Nichols Eberstadt 
 
A. SOUTH KOREA 
With the clock winding down on Kim Dae-jung’s leadership in South Korea, his 
legacy is squarely in the hands of Kim Jong- il. A reciprocal visit by the North’s leader to 
Seoul has been promised since the historic June 2000 summit, but issue upon issue has 
aided in its never coming to fruition. Already heavily politicized domestically, President 
Kim may create a political firestorm if he concedes too much to the North in order to 
assure a legacy-establishing summit in Seoul before his term ends. Further politicizing 
the issue, the December 2002 presidential election will put a spotlight on the South’s 
policies toward the North. This will further intensify domestic debate and drive a deeper 
wedge between the various schools of thought, playing into the hands of Pyongyang. 
Political instability is not unfamiliar to the South, but it does create an environment for 
the North to cling to its tactics of regime survival. 252 
Thus, public disagreement over the policy of engagement is largely the result of 
the inter-Korean relationship being at a crossroads. There still exist two very conflicting 
elements in the minds of many: hostility toward North Korea and yearnings for 
unification. The result is a divided public with some still clinging to the Cold War era 
psychology and others with a new mindset of the post-Cold War world. This division will 
lead the public to use different yardsticks. The truth is that the existence of diverse views 
about North Korea is never harmful, and to some extent an inevitable phenomenon. South 
Korea itself is undergoing a transitional period, leaving behind the old relationship of 
confrontation and moving towards one of unity and cooperation.  
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The effect of this public debate is the birth of a new sense of convergence among 
liberals and conservatives within the national debate. It will hopefully bridge the gap in 
views of North Korea and filter the extremist voices out of the debate. The radical 
sentiment among some college students and workers has significantly diminished in 
public debates. In addition, a large number of people with conservative background have 
begun entertaining the thought of visiting North Korea, a sign of growing acceptance of 
North.  
 
B. NORTH KOREA 
Can the North be trusted as a business partner? North Korea has failed to honor 
almost all of the commitments it has agreed to in accordance with the June 2000 Joint 
Declaration. Its erratic behavior has called into question its willingness to come to terms 
with South Korea more broadly. Above all, the North has made no effort to discard its 
ambition to unify the Korean peninsula under North Korean terms. The North’s strategy 
still supports its traditional united front to undermine the ROK government.253 
In fact, North Korea’s approach continues to remain essentially offensive in 
nature. The military continues to receive the overwhelming priority, despite miserable 
economic conditions. By doing so, the North is maintaining its long-term goal of 
unification on North Korean terms and the short-term goal of providing security for the 
preservation of the North Korean regime. Although assured mutual South Korean 
response, the North continues to refuse to reduce its military posture, which would allow 
a diversion of resources to more pressing needs.254 
North Korea has been showing signs of change since 1990, when the country was 
experiencing enormous economic difficulties, including severe shortages in energy, food 
and foreign currency. Its people began wandering in search for food, while others risked 
their lives to cross borders to survive. Economic improvement soon became a top policy 
priority, with the regime openly seeking contacts with the outside world in search of 
foreign aid as well as investments. The food shortage, paradoxically, also served as a 
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factor for change because famine made North Koreans more inclined to favor any system 
that could provide daily necessities over their traditional system of rationing.  
On the diplomatic front, the North has been seeking a similar transformation. 
While it sought to maintain friendly relations with traditional allies such as China and 
Russia, it has also sought to open itself up to the international community and build better 
diplomatic relations with the outside world. Its participation in the ARF (ASEAN 
Regional Forum) reflects the North's effort to improve its image on the international 
stage.  
Moreover, the North has become more active than ever in reaching out to the 
world to learn about capitalism and the market system. Last year alone, Pyongyang 
dispatched as many as 500 of its scholars and officials to the United States, Europe and 
elsewhere, in hopes of acquiring the skills needed for a market economy, particularly in 
the areas of international economics, financing, trade and accounting. The North's pace of 
transformation has slowed in the aftermath of September 11th and the subsequent anti-
terrorism campaign. In view of North Korea's long-held rigidity and policy of isolation, 
signs of transformation should neither be taken for granted nor dismissed as insignificant.  
 
C. UNITED STATES 
The U.S. goals in Korea are not always necessarily the same as the Korea’s. In 
that vein, the United States has not invested economically in North Korea, nor has it 
wholly adopted the principles of Roh’s “Nordpolitik” or Kim’s “Sunshine policy.” The 
United States is, and has been, one of the South’s largest investors and trading partners. 
The North, aside from its socialist system, is not an attractive economic investment for 
American businessmen. The North’s human rights record and sponsorship of terrorism 
and weapons of mass destruction have caused the United States to label them an enemy 
and thereby impose economic sanctions upon them. Regardless, the possibility of Korean 
economic integration and joint ventures across the DMZ could be a building block to ease 
American tensions, revise its sanction policies, and attract U.S. investment.255 
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D. GERMANY AND YEMEN 
A slow, careful approach to reducing tension and increasing ties between the two 
Koreas is needed to provide time for a more complete integration of the two societies 
prior to full unification. Such an approach could mitigate the impact of some of the more 
socially disruptive and economically costly aspects of the unification process. After 
unification, Korea will be preoccupied internally. All available capital will be channeled 
into reconstructing the threadbare North. The daunting task of infrastructure investment 
and industry retooling will take years. As the cases of Yemen and Germany show, a more 
deliberate economic union and integration prior to unification will ease many of these 
burdens. 
Although much can be learned from both German and Yemeni unification, there 
are some characteristics unique to Korea that will affect a smooth unification, although 
not all will do so in a negative manner. These include limitations on foreign investment, 
relatively large military forces (both in size and level of expenditure), and the relative 
difference between the size of the North and South’s populations and economies.256 
However, these obstacles are not insurmountable, but will take a considerable amount of 
effort to overcome. 
If the Yemeni case reveals anything, it is that if two diametrically opposed 
political and economic systems persist into unification, the friction that exists between 
them will at best severely hamper the effort, or worse, lead to violence. On the other 
hand, Germany may have successfully avoided such an outcome because the East 
German population clearly saw communism for the economic failure it was. Admitting 
economic failure will have to take place in North Korea in order to begin implementing 
market-based reforms as part of an incremental economic union. 257 
Additional factors that are unique to Korea are likely to make the process more 
complex and difficult than that experienced by either Germany or Yemen. While 
ideological differences may give rise to fears of a Yemeni- like “divorce” following a 
hasty unification, strategic impediments and major power support for a peaceful process 
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are likely to overcome any such tendencies. The stakes are too high to allow Korea to 
spiral into another civil war, which would be its last. 
 
E. CHINA AND VIETNAM 
At the time of the reforms in China and Vietnam, their economies were much 
more agrarian than North Korea is today. In 1978, 71 percent of the Chinese economy 
consisted of the agricultural sector. The same can be said of Vietnam in 1989. The North 
Korean economy, however, is heavily industrialized, with agriculture only making up 
about 30 percent of the economy. Because of the their large agricultural sectors at the 
time of adopting economic reforms, China and Vietnam were extremely successfully in 
their ability to shift extremely low productivity labor out of agriculture and into emerging 
non-state-owned light industry. North Korea, on the other hand, is a more industrialized 
economy, thus making reform efforts that much more challenging. 
Furthermore, in China and Vietnam, the reforms were accepted easily and under 
relatively secure political and military conditions. In North Korea, the existence of a 
democratic and prosperous South Korea creates an enormous ideological challenge. 
Following the adoption of market reforms, the movement of people within the country to 
find work, and the realization that Juche was more of a failure than a success, would 
create social instability that may overwhelm the regime. Thus the North treats economic 
liberalization with extreme caution. Regardless, some studies predict that the North 
Korean economy would grow by as much as 50 percent within just a few years after 
economic reform.258 
China and Vietnam are examples of gradualist economic reform. Because of the 
size and scope of the industrial sectors in each country, the reform strategy has thus far 
been successful, especially initially. Both countries were largely agrarian with very little 
heavy industry. Thus, the growth and increased standard of living that resulted from 
initial agricultural reforms provided a cushion to absorb some of the political turmoil of 
reform and in addition countered the erosion of political legitimacy. In North Korea, 
because of its centrally planned and heavily industrialized economy, the gradualist 
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approach would be an unsuccessful option. 259 However, the reforms in China do provide 
a good analysis of what North Korea potentially faces. 
 
F. UNIFICATION 
With all the uncertainties inherent in the process of national reunification, and 
considering the high stakes involved in what may become a zero-sum game, it is 
understandable that the high ideal of national unity should be sacrificed or deferred. In 
short, reunification is highly desirable but it should not be attempted by force nor should 
it follow collapse. Moreover, Korean reunification, even a sudden unexpected one, would 
result in benefits as well as costs. Enlightened and foresighted policy could 
systematically augment those benefits.260 
Nicholas Eberstadt points out the benefits, short term and long term, of 
reunification with a poorer partner.261 It would: 
· Help relieve South Korea’s incipient labor shortage. 
· Reduce pressures on wages and production costs. 
· Enhance Korea’s international competitiveness. 
· Increase purchasing power and living standards for the majority. 
· Generate dynamic supply side effects from newly installed capital stock. 
· Replace decrepit northern facilities with state-of-the-art technology. 
The last point alone would spawn lower production costs, enhance productivity, and 
stimulate the work force, thus laying the foundation for sustained long-term growth. 
Internationally, “the boom in domestic demand that would follow a successful Korean 
reunification would likely offer wide-ranging and lucrative business opportunities to all 
the Pacific powers.”262 
 
G. SUMMARY 
In summary, one of the primary goals of a unified Korea is to create an economic 
union that has the potential to grow, provide, and lead. A unified Korea, with its diligent 
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work force, a highly educated population of 70 million, and a greatly reduced defense 
budget, would be a strong economic power, especially in sectors where South Korea 
already has a geographic and product advantage.263 South Korean chaebol are strong in 
the areas where many seek investment: construction, heavy engineering, automobiles, 
and consumer goods.264 The industries and firms of a unified Korea may also be freer 
from political considerations in trading issues than its leading rivals.265 In turn, there will 
be of greater advantage to Korean companies investing in the Far East as well as other 
global markets. A gradual and incremental economic union prior to a political unification 
will best create an environment conducive to this kind of economic success story.  
The gradual and calculated economic integration of the Korean peninsula will be 
a long-term project that will require serious patience and perseverance. Nicholas 
Eberstadt points out that integration assumes “North Korea’s government will someday 
embrace a program of economic liberalization, and would somehow survive to complete 
the decades of transformation that such a program would entail.”266 As evident in its 
historical economic behavior, this conclusion seems remote at best for the current North 
Korean regime. However, a continued separate economic future will only widen the gap 
between the North and the South and further increase the possibility of catastrophe. Any 
delay in economic integration will also continue to increase the costs of unification, 
creating enlarged burdens for the South as the North further continues its economic 
decline.  
The primitive economic condition in the North and the yawning social gap 
between the two peoples is a major impediment to the ultimate integration of the two 
systems. Building trust gradually through economic and humanitarian exchanges is a 
means for advancing both the short and long-term goals of peaceful coexistence and 
eventual unification. 267 Since armament is the outcome of both external and internal 
processes, there is not much that can be done with the internal dynamics of North Korea. 
However, “a more practical approach would be to ‘buy peace’ in the literal sense of the 
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term, i.e. massive investment aid from the South, which would in the end bring about 
stability and reform in the North. Economic cooperation is the best ‘confidence-building 
measure’ of the South.”268 
The scenario of gradual economic unification prior to political union provides a 
solution for unification that will allow South Korea to avoid many of the problems 
associated with the unification of Germany and Yemen. However, differences in culture, 
government, and people as well as the economy will necessitate different results. No 
model will be 100 percent accurate in predicting the complex interactions between the 
peoples and the integrated economy of North and South Korea.269 Albeit, the unification 
of North and South Korea seems to be an undisputed eventuality, at the current time 
Korean unification appears to be merely a noble but unrealistic goal for the immediate 
future. 
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